Federal Tax Competition - How a Country\u27s Federal Framework Affects its Position in Competing for Increasingly Mobile Capital by Tillmann, Lisa
Federal Tax Competition
- How a Country’s Federal Framework Aﬀects its Position in
Competing for Increasingly Mobile Capital -
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(Dr. rer. pol.)
von der Fakulta¨t fu¨r
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
des Karlsruher Institut fu¨r Technologie (KIT)
genehmigte
DISSERTATION
von
Diplom-Volkswirtin (Int.) Lisa Tillmann
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 25. Mai 2011
Referent: Professor Dr. Berthold U. Wigger
Korreferent: Professor Dr. Jan Kowalski
2011 Karlsruhe
Federal Tax Competition
- How a Country’s Federal Framework Aﬀects its Position in
Competing for Increasingly Mobile Capital -
Lisa Tillmann
Danksagung
Diese Arbeit entstand im Rahmen meiner Ta¨tigkeit als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin
am Lehrstuhl fu¨r Finanzwissenschaft und Public Management am Karlsruher Institut fu¨r
Technologie.
Zu allererst danke ich meinem Doktorvater, Herrn Professor Dr. Berthold U. Wigger fu¨r
die Mo¨glichkeit der Anfertigung sowie die wertvolle Betreuung der Arbeit. Herrn Professor
Dr. Jan Kowalski bin ich fu¨r die U¨bernahme des Korrefereats zu Dank verpﬂichtet, ebenso wie
Herrn Professor Dr. Martin E. Ruckes fu¨r seine Rolle als Pru¨fer im Rahmen der Disputation.
Herrn Professor Dr. Bruno Neibecker mo¨chte ich fu¨r seine Funktion als Pru¨fungsvorsitzender
danken.
Ich danke außerdem meinen Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die mich in den Jahren am
Lehrstuhl begleitet und unterstu¨tzt haben.
Mein wichtigster Dank gilt meinem Freund, Marco Riva, fu¨r seinen Beistand, sein Versta¨ndnis
und seine Geduld, insbesondere in den schwierigen Phasen der Anfertigung dieser Arbeit.
Zuletzt ist es mir ein besonderes Anliegen, mich bei meiner Familie und meinen guten
Freunden fu¨r ihren sta¨ndigen Ru¨ckhalt zu bedanken. Meinen Geschwistern und Freunden
danke ich dafu¨r, dass sie jederzeit ein oﬀenes Ohr fu¨r meine Sorgen hatten und mich auf
andere Gedanken gebracht haben. Meinen Eltern danke ich daru¨berhinaus fu¨r ihre sta¨ndige
bedingungslose Unterstu¨tzung im Rahmen meiner Ausbildung, ohne die das Verfassen dieser
Arbeit sicher nicht gelungen wa¨re.
Karlsruhe, im Sommer 2011
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Purpose of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 A Note on Fiscal Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Aims and Design of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Literature Review 10
2.1 Theoretical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.1 Interregional Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Federal Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.3 International Federal Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Empirical Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.1 Estimating Federal Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2.2 Interregional Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.3 Federal Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.4 Eﬃciency Enhancing Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3 Federal Tax Competition and Capital Market Integration 41
3.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.2 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.3 Capital Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.4 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.5 Government Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Horizontal and Vertical Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.1 Are State Taxes Too High or Too Low? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 Are Federal Taxes Too High or Too Low? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2.3 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
i
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
4 Tax Competition and Federal Design 59
4.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2 Two Unitary Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2.1 Capital Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.2 Government Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 Unitary and Federal Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.1 Capital Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.2 Government Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.3 Cross-Jurisdictional Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3.4 Total Revenue Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Interaction of Two Federal States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.1 Capital Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.2 Government Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.3 Cross-Jurisdictional Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.4 Total Revenue Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Conclusion 87
5.1 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6 References 93
ii
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
List of Figures
1.1 Taxes on Corporate Income in the EU-15 and OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Tax Revenue Structure within OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Cost of International Capital Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2 Non-Arbitrage Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Non-Arbitrage Equilibrium - Benchmark Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
iii
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
List of Abbreviations
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
EU European Union
EU-15 Fifteen member states comprising the European Union until 2004
IMF International Monetary Fund
LHS Left-hand side (of an equation)
MCF (Perceived) marginal cost of public funds
ML Maximum-Likelihood
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
RHS Right-hand side (of an equation)
SMBF Social marginal beneﬁt of public funds
SMCF Social marginal cost of public funds
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
U.S. United States
ZMW Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson model of interregional tax competition
iv
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
List of Symbols
b State/regional tax base
B Federal tax base
C Cost of investing abroad
c Consumption of a private good
f ′(k) Marginal product of capital
g Consumption of a public good provided at the state/regional level
G Consumption of a public good provided at the federal level
k Amount of capital invested in one state/region
n,m Number of states/regions in federation A,B respectively
r¯ World market interest rate
r Tax revenue generated in one state/region
R Tax revenue generated by the central government of a federation
t Capital tax rate prevalent in one state/region
T Capital tax rate chosen by the federal government
u Utility
wij Weight assigned to region j according to shared borders with region i
y Production in one state/region
Γ(g,G) Utility function for the consumption of public goods
δ Tax rate on rental income π levied by the state/regional governments
v
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
Δ Tax rate on rental income π levied by the federal government
θ Consolidated tax rate on rental income π
π Rental income accruing to an individual in one state/region
ρ Net return on capital investments
σ Degree of international capital mobility
τ Consolidated capital tax rate prevalent in one state/region
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Purpose of the Study
This dissertation intends to enhance the discussion of how a country’s federal framework
shapes its position in the context of international competition for a mobile capital tax base.
Precisely, it examines how multi-levelled government aﬀects the eﬃciency of chosen capital
tax rates with a particular focus on the internationalisation of capital markets. It derives
its raison d’eˆtre from various perspectives. For one, a federal structure leads to an ease
of mobility between regions, such that these are faced with a mobile tax base, which may
not be the case for the central government. Then, with a worldwide trend towards ﬁscal
decentralisation and the integration of international capital markets, competition for mobile
tax base not only within the federation, but between countries of diﬀerent federal design, is
a particularly relevant issue.
The public perception of an increasingly globalised economy appears to be shaped by
the potential threats rather than the opportunities. The connotation of international capital
investment activities with the biblical ‘Plague of the Locusts’ prominently shaped by repre-
sentatives of the German Social Democratic Party,1 which has even found its way into the
annual report of the German Council of Economic Experts,2 seems to have hit a nerve then
and has been further fuelled as a consequence of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The perception of
international tax competition, particularly for mobile capital, leading to a ‘race to the bot-
tom’ in tax rates culminating in an attempt to attract mobile capital at the cost of citizens
appears to be widespread and resilient. Yet countries do not seem to have gone bankrupt in
droves, such that the analysis of the exact forces shaping the consequences of globalisation
is highly relevant.
In fact, capital income or corporate tax rates in the OECD countries have been reduced
1See, for example, NZZ (2005).
2See German Council of Economic Experts (2005), page 35.
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over the past decades.3 Nonetheless, tax revenues have remained relatively stable. Figure
1.1 shows the development of revenues from the taxation of corporate income for the time
between 1965 and 2008. They are depicted as a percentage of total taxation and of GDP
for the EU-15 and the OECD. Over the considered time period, a drop can be observed for
Figure 1.1: Taxes on Corporate Income in the EU-15 and OECD
Source: Based on OECD (2010)
the EU-15 from 2000 to 2005, which may be indicative of the 2004 enlargement to have had
an impact on corporate income taxation. Yet, abstracting from the dip in 2008, which is
likely to have been essentially driven by the consequences of the ﬁnancial crisis, the overall
trend shows that tax revenues relative to GDP have not been subject to signiﬁcant declines.
Likewise, the weight of corporate tax receipts in the composition of total tax revenues also
does not appear to have receded signiﬁcantly. Figure 1.1 thus illustrates that the feared loss
of corporate tax proceeds does not seem to have become manifest on average in the OECD
and EU-15 over the past decades. In the same direction, Devereux et al. (2004) examine
corporate taxation in the UK to ﬁnd that the observed reduction of tax rates did not have
an impact on tax revenues. Auerbach (2007) studies the taxation of corporate income in the
3See, for example, OECD (2010) or Devereux et al. (2008) for more detail.
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United States, where likewise, tax rates have gone down, while revenues have gone up. In
the same direction, Becker and Fuest (2010) ﬁnd that German corporate tax revenues at the
German state level (‘La¨nder’) have in fact risen with a higher degree of internationalisation.
With these studies not necessarily supporting the view of the negative impact of globalisation,
it becomes an even more relevant question as to which factors drive the development of tax
rates and tax revenues. Some potential explanations, such as a broadening of tax base or the
growth of the respective sector, are given in the cited studies. The explicit consideration of
a country’s federal setup may yield further insights.
The relevance of this topic becomes apparent by considering the case of the European
Union. It currently consists of 27 member states, each of which have their own historically
grown federal framework. With EU enlargement and integration, capital ﬂows easily within
Europe4 and the number of member states is growing. That has various implications relevant
in the context of this study. For one, next to increasingly intense worldwide competition for
mobile capital, EU member states are faced with strong tax competition by other member
states due to free capital mobility, where a common labour market and increasingly uni-
form adjudication across countries further raise the possibilities for investors to freely choose
where to locate their capital. Next to the perception of individual member countries, the
European Union may be seen as a player in its own right. As the recent ﬁnancial crisis
demonstrated, it is not simply a loose collection of nations sharing open borders. On the
contrary, monetary and commodity markets are interdependent to such an extent that poli-
cies of one country aﬀect the entire union. The need for consolidated activities might lead
to the EU being justly perceived as a single federation of states. While there is as yet no
genuine supranational revenue source, its introduction has been on the political agenda since
the early stages of the European Economic Monetary Union.5 The most recent advance by
the European Commission in favour of a genuine EU tax as part of a reform of its ﬁnancing
scheme6 may, however, be quite relevant given the recent shift towards a higher degree of
ﬁscal responsibility at the EU level. To that end, the European Union may well be perceived
as directly competing with countries such as the United States or China, which themselves
have a more or less federal structure.7 Hence, the explicit recognition of the federal design
of competing nations, which may as well shape how the respective country is aﬀected by tax
competition,8 is of high relevance for the analysis of tax setting within the Union as well as
for its position competing with other regions.
4EU membership grants the full liberalisation of capital ﬂows between countries, as established in articles
63ﬀ. TFEU.
5See Wartha (2007) for a detailed discussion.
6See European Commission (2010).
7In that context, see, for example, the empirical results by Altshuler and Goodspeed (2003) on tax
competition between the United States and the European Union, which will be discussed in section 2.2.2.
8See section 2.1.3.
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Beyond Europe, there has been a worldwide trend towards ﬁscal decentralisation over the
past decades. Next to those established federal countries that have been studied extensively in
the existing literature,9 several emerging and developing countries have introduced elements
of ﬁscal decentralisation.10 This tendency may be driven by such promotion through the
World Bank or the IMF and may be restricted to the implementation of transfer schemes
rather than actual local revenue autonomy, as suggested by Brueckner (2009). A global trend
towards ﬁscal decentralisation may nonetheless culminate in growing numbers of countries
actually adapting federal tax systems, such that the recognition of the consequences of tax
base overlap becomes even more relevant.
1.2 A Note on Fiscal Federalism
The concept of federalism is subject to the dynamic character of the political process. A
federation may be deﬁned as a country comprising a number of independent states11 under
a common legislature, with public responsibilities divided between the central and the state
governments as assigned by the constitution.12 According to Galligan (2008), a federation
is characterised by three features: (i) a written constitution that cannot be easily amended;
(ii) bicameral legislature by the central and regional government representatives; (iii) judicial
review. The evolution of federal structure may be politically motivated or promise economic
advantages by proﬁting from possible scale economies or reduced decision-making costs. It
may arise as an agreement among formally independent states13 or as a consequence of
the decentralisation of a former unitary state, as, for instance, in Belgium or Brazil. Several
unitary countries, such as France or Italy, while not being federations per constitution, in fact
have introduced elements of decentralisation.14 China, which has evolved from a centrally
9See section 2.2 for more detail.
10Among the former Soviet countries, for example, next to Russia, such reforms have been implemented
in Poland (see, for example Shah (2004) for more detail), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Bryson et al.
(2004)) or Romania (Sorin-Dinca and Dinca (2009)). South Africa (see Bahl (2001) for an analysis), Kenia
(Bagaka (2008)) or Nigeria (Shah (2004)) have introduced elements of ﬁscal federalism as well as Argentina
and Chile (Shah (2006)), Brazil (deMello (2008)), Mexico and Colombia (Shah (2004)) or Peru (Ahmad and
Garcia-Escribano (2006)). In the Asian region, ﬁscal decentralisation was a driver of reform in China and
India (see Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) for more detail), Indonesia (Comola and deMello (2010)) or
the Philippines (Llanto (2009) and Uchimura and Suzuki (2009)).
11Or provinces, regions, cantons, departments, etc.
12See, for example, Schubert and Klein (2006).
13This is the case, for example, in the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany or Switzerland.
14Among others, Levi (2009) discusses the recent reform in Italy, whose ﬁscal system has been characterised
by central revenue collection with subsequent distribution of revenues to the respective regions. It is currently
in the process of passing a reform to resort to signiﬁcantly higher degrees of revenue decentralisation with an
equalisation grant scheme across provinces.
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planned tradition, is often referred to as a ‘de facto federation’ given its high degree of
state-level autonomy.15 Such tendencies are often attributed to an attempt to stabilise large
and highly heterogeneous or fragmented countries by granting the regions a strong degree
of independence.16 The latter may also apply to Spain, whose unitary structure is highly
decentralised. The resulting devolution of (ﬁscal) responsibilities is often the consequence of
extensive bargaining and interregional competition processes that may result in asymmetric
intergovernmental arrangements within a federation.17
Figure 1.2: Tax Revenue Structure within OECD
Source: Based on OECD (2010)
This diﬀerentiated view of decentralised ﬁscal structure is illustrated by ﬁgure 1.2, which
depicts the revenue structure of selected OECD countries for 2008. Precisely, it lists the share
of government revenues at each jurisdictional level in total government revenues. It includes
eight of its member states as federations and another 25 unitary countries. It becomes
apparent that the attribution of tax revenues to lower level jurisdictions does not hinge on a
15See, for example, Ho (2010) or Zheng (2007). For an overview of the speciﬁc issues concerning the
decentralisation of former centrally planned countries refer to Rao (2008).
16See, for example, Bird and Ebel (2008).
17For a further discussion, see Congleton (2008).
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country being perceived as unitary or federal. Across individual countries, the composition
of revenues diﬀers signiﬁcantly. OECD (2010)18 shows that for the included federations, on
average, 52% of total revenues are attributed to the central government, while 18.7% and
8.3% are attributed to the state/regional and local level respectively.19 In Spain, 32.4% of
total government revenues apply at the central level, while 22.3% (8.9%) apply at the state
(local) level. Of the further included 24 unitary countries, an average of 62.8% of total
government revenues are attributed to the central, while 12.4% are attributed to the local
level. The individual ﬁgures for each country reﬂect the respective historically grown federal
structure and interjurisdictional arrangements, such that they may not be too useful to be
compared directly. Yet the point is illustrated that the decentralisation of revenues does not
necessarily hinge on whether a country has a unitary or a federal structure.
The economic approach to ﬁscal federalism thus includes the analysis of the ﬁscal relations
among jurisdictions at diﬀerent levels,20 while abstracting from the constitutional deﬁnition
of a federal or unitary state. It comprises the decentralisation of expenditure or revenue
authority as well as the existence of ﬁscal equalisation schemes. The economics literature
on ﬁscal federalism has, over the past years, developed quite intensively and diversely.21
Early approaches focus on the eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects of a decentralised federal struc-
ture. Tiebout (1956) is the ﬁrst to point towards how interregional competition for mobile
citizens within a federation can raise welfare. In his ‘Decentralisation Theorem’ Oates (1972)
prominently formalises the argument that the uniform supply of public goods at the central
level of a country can be replaced by local provision tailored to the actual preferences of the
citizens, thereby increasing overall welfare.22 Various strands of literature rooted in these per-
ceptions subsequently evolved. The literature on environmental federalism that emphasises
the beneﬁts (and risks) of decentralised decision-making with respect to ecological standards
builds on Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem.23 The ideas formulated by Tiebout (1956) have
substantially shaped the most inﬂuential contributions on interregional tax competition, for
example, by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) or Wilson (1986). Further approaches, which
have their roots in the Pigouvian perspective on the internalisation of spillover eﬀects across
18See OECD (2010) table E, page 28.
19Percentage points missing to 100 are assigned to social security funds or supranational-level revenues (as
in the case of the EU member states).
20See Ahmad and Brosio (2008).
21See, for example, Oates (2005, 2008), for relatively recent surveys on the diﬀerent strands of research in
ﬁscal federalism.
22Oates (1972) abstracts from possible scale economies and restricts the view to welfare-maximising gov-
ernments.
23See, for example, Dinan, Cropper and Portney (1999), Oates (2002) or, more recently Banzhaf and Chupp
(2010).
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regions,24 argue in favour of the existence of intergovernmental grant or ﬁscal equalisation
schemes.25 Extending Niskanen’s (1971) view of policymakers as Leviathans rather than
welfare maximisers, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) make the point of the welfare-increasing
potential of decentralisation by constraining the incumbents’ revenue-maximising ambitions.
Other approaches, which Oates (2008) refers to as the ‘second generation of ﬁscal fed-
eralism’ incorporate elements of public choice, contract theory or information asymmetries
into the ﬁscal federalism literature and explicitly take into account the typical incentive
and decision-making structures arising from decentralisation as well as including its possi-
ble distortive eﬀects. Such approaches also analyse the devolution of ﬁscal responsibilities
within a country.26 One strand of literature takes a political economy approach to ﬁscal
federalism and explicitly models the motivation behind a politician’s actions as well as the
structure of decision-making and electoral processes that shape ﬁscal outcomes under de-
centralised as opposed to unitary states.27 Based on early contributions by Kornai (1979,
1986), some authors explicitly consider the formation of ﬁscal budget rules and how they
inﬂuence government behaviour.28 The yardstick competition literature, as shaped by Besley
and Case (1995)29 further conjectures that federal structure leads to a better comparability
between regions, such that policymakers may have incentives to engage in tax mimicking
behaviour, while at the same time voters have a means to evaluate the performance of their
incumbents, thereby restraining possible rent-seeking behaviour of governments. Such in-
formational spillovers within a federation are also incorporated into the so-called laboratory
federalism approaches,30 in which the direct comparison of regions under a federal structure
provides a framework that favours innovation in such that ﬁscal reforms implemented by
particularly innovative regions may later be adapted across the federation.
Notwithstanding the vast array of research on ﬁscal federalism, this dissertation focuses
on the revenue side in the context of federal decisionmaking with a particular focus on com-
petition for a mobile capital tax base.31 In what follows, the distinction of a federation in
24See, Pigou (1947).
25See Boadway (2006) for a survey on the literature on equalisation grant schemes.
26See, for example, Congleton (2008) or Eichenberger and Frey (2008) for a detailed discussion.
27Some of the well-known contributions in that respect include Lockwood (2002, 2006), Besley and Coate
(2003) as well as Persson and Tabellini (1992, 2002). Guriev et al. (2010) provide a recent contribution in
that context discussing how interest groups shape federal policies.
28Ambrosanio and Bordignon (2008) develop instruments for the assignment of revenues within a federation.
The consequences of soft or hard budget constraints within a federation have been analysed by Wildasin
(1997), Qian and Roland (1998) or Goodspeed (2002a) and later Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) or Fink
and Stratmann (2009).
29More recent contributions include Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) or Rincke (2006, 2009).
30See, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1980), Strumpf (2002), Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006a, 2006b) or
Kerber and Eckardt (2007).
31There are, of course, various approaches with a focus on other types of taxes in the existing literature on
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contrast to a unitary country will thus refer to a country with a decentralised capital tax rev-
enue structure irrespective of its constitutional speciﬁcations. The existing literature, which
will be discussed in detail in chapter 2, analyses taxation in a federation with several states
and one federal government, which is generally characterised by two elements: competition
for mobile tax bases between lower level jurisdictions and concurrent taxation of the same
tax bases by lower level jurisdictions and the central government. Tax competition gives
rise to horizontal externalities, as each lower level jurisdiction ignores the positive eﬀect of a
higher own tax rate on tax revenue of the other lower level jurisdictions. Taxation will then
be too low in equilibrium.32 Concurrent taxation, on the other hand, gives rise to vertical
tax externalities, as each lower level jurisdiction ignores the negative eﬀect of a higher own
tax rate on the central government’s tax revenue, and vice versa. This leaves tax rates too
high in equilibrium.33 Given that the two elements of federal taxation have opposite welfare
eﬀects, the question which may be dominant in a given setting is of high relevance and will
be discussed with reference to the international integration of capital markets in the course
of this thesis.
1.3 Aims and Design of the Study
With the issues outlined so far, the intention of this contribution is to enhance the discussion
regarding the following questions:
1. What is the current state of research on the consequences of international tax compe-
tition with regard to the decentralised revenue structure of a country?
2. How does the increasing integration of international capital markets aﬀect the taxation
of capital?
3. How does a country’s federal framework aﬀect its position when competing with other
countries for an internationally mobile capital tax base?
Hence, this dissertation is setup the following way: The second chapter reviews the exist-
ing empirical and theoretical literature relevant in the context of this study. The theoretical
focus will for one part lie on contributions concerning the taxation of mobile capital with
federal tax setting. As such, concurrent taxation of personal income has been the subject of analysis, among
others, in Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Boadway et al. (1998) or, more recently, Klor (2006) and Aronsson
(2010). Excise taxation of consumption goods is also widely examined, as, for example, in Besley and Rosen
(1998), Devereux et al. (2007) or Rizzo (2010).
32Among others, refer to Wildasin (1989), or dePater and Myers (1994).
33See, for instance, Wigger and Wartha (2004), or Makris (2006).
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interregional competition, thereby characterising the respective horizontal eﬀects. Subse-
quently, models analysing taxation in a federation with an active federal and multiple lower
level governments are considered. These identify tax base overlap as a source of vertical ex-
ternalities, whose interaction with horizontal externalities triggered by lower level tax compe-
tition culminates in the question which of these will be dominant in a given setting. Finally,
the small literature combining the contributions on international horizontal tax competition
with the insights from the federal taxation literature is reviewed. The survey of the empirical
literature starts by discussing studies aiming to ﬁnd evidence of horizontal tax interaction
between governments. It includes such interrelations among regional governments within
one country as well as international horizontal tax interactions, and further discusses how
these are aﬀected by increased capital market integration. Subsequently, the studies seeking
evidence of vertical tax interaction within a federation are reviewed, followed by a discussion
of contributions aiming to clarify whether governments are more appropriately assumed to
have revenue or welfare maximising intentions, a distinction that is found to be relevant in
the review of the theoretical literature. Chapter 2 concludes by summarising the results and
pointing towards further topics of research. It derives a set of key questions that appear
to be relevant for the analysis of policy implications by federal tax competition. The thus
identiﬁed key aspects are sought to be further analysed in chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 3 considers a federation whose degree of integration into international capital
markets is explicitly modelled and analyses the eﬃciency of the resulting tax rates. It is
found that strong integration into international capital markets functions by limiting the
extent to which horizontal externalities may deter tax setting within a federation, such that
the vertical externality has a relatively stronger impact on the overall tax burden.
The scope is extended to analyse two countries competing for mobile capital while allowing
for diﬀerences in federal design by each of the countries in chapter 4. It considers two unitary
countries as a reference case for purely horizontal interaction. The model is then expanded
to include the interaction of a federal and a unitary country, in order to ﬁnally examine
two competing federations. The respective externalities arising in each of the three cases
are evaluated and policy implications are derived. Among other things, it turns out that
federal structure may have a positive impact regarding a country’s position in international
tax competition.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes by summarising the results and pointing out their implica-
tions with regard to the key questions derived in chapter 2. It further depicts the policy
implications to be drawn from the discussion of federal tax competition as well as further
topics of research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
“Competition between government units at the same or at a diﬀerent level ex-
plains fundamental characteristics of the working of decentralized systems, and is
potentially a crucial factor for their eﬃciency.”
This quote from the introduction of the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism1 highlights the rele-
vance of strategic interaction between jurisdictional entities and its interdependence with a
country’s federal organisation. Given the abundance of literature on federal tax competition,
this chapter intends to give a structured overview of the existing body of work. It is setup as
follows: The next section reviews the existing theoretical literature on capital taxation in a
federation and the implications of interregional tax competition within such a setting. The
existing empirical literature concerning federal tax competition is surveyed in section 2.2,
with a particular focus on interregional tax competition and its implications with respect
to federal structure. Section 2.3 concludes and derives some key questions relevant to the
evaluation of policymaking in the context of international federal tax competition.
2.1 Theoretical Approaches
This section gives an overview of the existing theoretical approaches to federal capital tax
competition. It can be divided into the following major strands: For one, a federation is
seen as a bundle of regions under the common legislation of one country, where the federal
level does not actively participate in decisions. Hence, tax competition in a federation is
characterised by horizontal eﬀects occuring between jurisdictions at the same level.2 In
1See Ahmad and Brosio (2008), p. 22.
2In that respect, it is equivalent to international tax competition between countries. Surveys of the
literature on interregional tax competition exist, for instance, by Wilson (1999) or Wildasin and Wilson
(2004).
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another strand, the federal government is explicitly recognised as an active player, which
leads to vertical tax competition eﬀects being triggered by regional and federal decision-
makers interacting within one country. A third, more recent ﬁeld analyses tax regimes when
federations are explicitly modelled in competition with other countries. This section will give
an overview of the existing literature in each of these ﬁelds.
The reference case to assess the eﬃciency of tax setting is the solution reached by an
omniscient central planner under distortive taxation tailored to each region. The analysis is
restricted to approaches in which the strategy variable is the chosen tax rate, despite being
perfectly aware that other variables, such as the level of expenditures, the provision of a public
consumption good or publicly provided inputs for production have also been considered. The
respective outcomes essentially hinge on the government’s objective function. Typically, the
literature distinguishes between the perception of revenue-maximising Leviathan governments
or benevolent welfare-maximising decision-makers.3
In the reference case, a central Leviathan government will choose tax rates, such that
the country reaches the maximum of the Laﬀer curve4. By contrast, in a federation of
Leviathans, the objective functions of governments diﬀer in such that each policymaker only
cares about own revenues, which triggers the respective externalities to be characterised in
the proceeding sections. Ineﬃcient taxation then implies that revenues are not maximised by
choice of the tax rate. With ineﬃciently low tax rates a country ﬁnds itself on the upward-
sloping side of the Laﬀer-curve, while the reverse holds for ineﬃciently high tax rates.5 Since
revenue-maximisation does not imply welfare-maximisation,6 by limiting the Leviathan in its
possibility for wasteful consumption, welfare may in fact be raised through lower tax rates.
A benevolent government typically aims to maximise its citizens’ utility
u(c, g, G), where c is private good consumption and g (G) is the amount of a public good
provided at the regional (federal) level.7 The omniscient central planner will achieve a second-
best optimum with distortive taxes choosing tax rates, such that the social marginal cost of
raising public funds equals their social marginal beneﬁt, that is, SMCF = SMBF .8 That
equality may be distorted by decentralisation in such that one jurisdiction’s government mis-
perceives the marginal cost of public funds and thus over- or underprovides the respective
public good. Ineﬃciently low tax rates then imply that welfare could be raised by an increase
3In that context, see, for example, Buchanan and Musgrave (2001).
4See Laﬀer (1979), which was earlier referred to by Wannisky (1978). The Leviathan approach is assigned
to Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980).
5In the latter case, revenues could be raised by a drop in tax rates, which is also referred to as the Laﬀer
paradoxon, as, for instance, in Dahlby (1996).
6See, for example, the seminal contributions by Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980).
7Utility may, of course, be varied or extended to include other elements. For instance, see Wrede (2002),
p. 62.
8For instance, see Keen (1998).
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in tax rates and vice versa. Ineﬃciencies may stem from diﬀering objective functions or from
the assumption of myopic governments.
2.1.1 Interregional Tax Competition
A federation consisting of n autonomous regions is ﬁrst considered, where decision-making is
perfectly decentralised. While the capital stock may be ﬁxed within the federation, capital
is typically assumed to be mobile across regions. That is, each jurisdiction i perceives its
capital tax base as elastic. Upon choosing its tax rate, each regional government will trigger
a positive horizontal externality, in such that investors will choose to relocate their capital,
thereby raising the other regions’ tax bases bj =i,9 such that
n−1∑
j =i=1
b′jti > 0.
Given that each government only accounts for its own tax base and neglects the expansion
of the other regions’ tax base, the resulting horizontal externality points towards ineﬃciently
low taxation. Whether or not interregional tax competition enhances or deters welfare, is
subject to the perspective taken. Therefore, those approaches assuming for governments to
be benevolent will be reviewed ﬁrst, followed by the results generated for Leviathans.
Benevolent Governments
With benevolent decision-makers, each regional government chooses to maximise its citizens’
utility by providing optimal opportunities for the consumption of public and private goods,
where public good provision is ﬁnanced from capital taxation (and, possibly, the taxation
of a ﬁxed factor, which is, however, mostly assumed to be exogenous).10 It will recognise
how not only its own decisions, but also those by every other institution feed back into its
inhabitants’ welfare function. It neglects, however, how its own choices aﬀect the utility of
other regions’ inhabitants, thereby triggering a horizontal externality that points towards
an underprovision of public goods. Tiebout (1956) established the view of interregional
tax competition raising eﬃciency via so-called Tiebout-sorting processes. The underlying
reasoning is that by choosing their preferred location, perfectly mobile households will induce
governments to internalise these externalities and to provide eﬃcient levels of public goods
and taxation.11 One of the central assumptions in the Tiebout world is that of public good
provision being ﬁnanced by beneﬁt taxation. That assumption is dropped in another strand
9See, for example, Wilson (2005).
10For instance, see Wilson (1999).
11Fischel (1976) and White (1976) ﬁrst integrated mobile proﬁt-maximising enterprises into a Tiebout-type
setting. More recent approaches can be found in Richter and Wellisch (1996) or Wellisch (2000).
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of tax competition literature, which was mainly shaped by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) or
Wilson (1986), hereafter referred to as ZMW.12 Typically, these models consider benevolent
regional governments which derive their entire budget from the taxation of capital13 engaging
in Nash competition over tax rates with the other regions. The federation consists of n
identical regions, each inhabited by one individual endowed with one unit of an immobile
factor to be used as an input for production (labour in the ZMW-approach) and one unit of
interregionally mobile capital. Investors will react towards given tax rates by locating capital
where its net return is highest, such that non-arbitrage will lead to the latter being equalised
across states. In the resulting equilibrium, chosen tax rates and public good provision in the
region will be ineﬃciently low due to interregional tax competition triggering the described
horizontal externality. In neglecting the positive impact its tax hike has on other jurisdictions
by expanding their tax base, the marginal cost of public funds perceived by each region is
greater than the ‘true’ social marginal cost of public funds (MCF > SMCF ).14
The situation changes when regions are no longer small (such that the net return on capital
equals the exogenous world market interest rate), but when large regions inﬂuence the net
return on capital within the federation by their choice of tax rate.15 The basic ZMW-result
still holds, but a tax hike in one region subsequently triggers a negative horizontal externality
by reducing the federation-wide net return on capital.16 That negative externality attenuates
the positive horizontal externality characterised by ZMW, such that the MCF perceived by
one region deviates from the SMCF by a lesser amount than in the case of small regions.
A further central result of the ZMW model is that while the mobile factor will be subject
to low tax rates, the resulting loss of revenues will be compensated by higher tax rates on
the immobile factor. Bond and Samuelson (1989) or Razin and Sadka (1991) even reach the
solution that tax rates on mobile capital will be zero in equilibrium.17 In contrast, if one
country is modelled as a Stackelberg leader, Gordon (1992) ﬁnds that positive capital tax
rates will be chosen. Furthermore, Goodspeed (1998) points out that the result of a zero tax
12A similar approach can be found in Wildasin (1989).
13The consideration of more than just one type of tax rate can be found in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991)
or Wilson (1991, 2005).
14Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) also examine the level of supply of a productive public good and also
obtain the result of its underprovision. Yet this result is driven by a speciﬁc assumption necessary for the
stability of their derived equilibrium, whose economic interpretation was criticised by Noiset (1995). The
result is no longer obtained when that assumption is dropped, as shown by Dhillon et al. (2007) who ﬁnd
that public good provision can then either be too low, too high or eﬃcient. Along the same lines, Keen and
Marchand (1997) ﬁnd indicators of overprovision of productive goods as opposed to private goods.
15Wildasin (1988) or Hoyt (1991) pursue such an approach.
16That horizontal externality is also characterised by DePater and Myers (1994), who speak of a ‘pecuniary
externality’.
17That result is in correspondence with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), according to whom production
eﬃciency requires for the governments to dispense with its taxation.
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rate is driven by the implicit assumption that capital draws no utility from the provision of
public goods and will no longer ensue if the latter is dropped.
Various subsequent papers dismiss the assumption of identical regions in favour of the
recognition of asymmetric tax competition. While in those approaches considering identical
regions, the resulting symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to an eﬃcient allocation of capital,
if this symmetry assumption is dropped, the ensuing asymmetric equilibrium will distort
capital allocation. Bucovetsky (1991) or Wilson (1991) consider regions diﬀering in size, as
expressed by the number of inhabitants and the amount of capital available.18 They generate
an asymmetric equilibrium, in which the large region chooses a higher tax rate than the
small region. That result can again be attributed to the large region’s impact on the overall
net return to capital within the federation, such that its tax base will react less elastically
towards a change in tax rates than that of the small jurisdiction. Public good provision will
be ineﬃciently low, yet welfare in the small region will be higher than in the large one, given
that the former is a net importer of capital and proﬁts from the positive externality triggered
by its competitor. Cooperation would raise overall welfare, yet if diﬀerences in population
are suﬃciently large, the small region will be worse oﬀ under collusion. In an extention,
DePater and Myers (1994) examine the strategic behaviour of large regions manipulating the
net return on capital in their favour, where the results in turn hinge on whether a country
is an importer or an exporter of capital. That is, in the former case, a country has an
incentive to raise its tax rate, such that the resulting drop in the net return on capital is
partially burdened on the foreign investors. The reverse holds in the latter case. Thereby,
the tendency towards an underprovision of the public good will be attenuated for capital
importing regions and augmented for capital exporting regions.
In another extention to the ZMW-model, Brueckner (2000, 2004) examines the eﬀect
of heterogeneous preferences regarding the supplied public goods. He shows that with an
increasing valuation of the public good, equilibrium tax rates and levels of provision will rise
at the cost of capital investments and wages. If one region is a monopolist in its production
and exports it to a neighbour, Noiset (2003) ﬁnds that the monopolist can partially impose
the burden of a capital tax hike on the consumers in the other region via the resulting
mark-up in prices.
Lee (1997) considers a two-period model in which capital is subject to transaction costs in
the second period after it was invested freely in period one. That limitation of interregional
capital investment mobility points towards ineﬃciently high tax rates, given that a tax hike
incurs a negative horizontal externality by reducing the net return on capital, while the loss
of capital tax base will be signiﬁcantly lower and may even approach zero.
18Bucovetsky (1991) assumes for a quadratic production function, while Wilson (1991) considers a general
one as well as further including the taxation of mobile labour to show that Bucovetsky’s results still hold.
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Cross-regional landownership within a federation as a means to internalise the occuring
positive externalities is discussed by Lee (2003). A region’s MCF will then be the closer to
the SMCF , the more interrelated ownership structures in the respective regions are.
If countries compete for capital tax base via the choice of capital tax rates and ecological
standards, Oates and Schwab (1988) ﬁnd that the prevalence of a tax on capital implies
ineﬃciently low ecological standards across the federation in such that each region neglects
the positive eﬀect it triggers on the others by raising its eco-standard and thereby losing
capital tax base.
An interesting recent contribution by Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010) includes the en-
dogenisation of leadership in a federation of competing regions. They ﬁnd that if regions
display a suﬃciently large degree of asymmetry, tax rates will be driven downwards less than
standard theory predicts and that the larger country will not necessarily choose a higher level
of tax rates.
Within the literature, remedies for the resulting ineﬃciencies have been suggested, for
example, by cooperation,19 Pigouvian subsidies or taxes,20 or the introduction of a ﬁscal
equalisation scheme.21 These are discussed in more detail at the end of section 2.1.2.
Leviathan Governments
When the assumption of benevolent governments is dropped for a revenue-maximising Leviathan
government, as prominently suggested by Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980), each regional
government chooses a tax rate such that the Laﬀer curve with respect to its regional budget
is maximised. With interregional tax competition, each decision-maker neglects the impact
its decisions have on revenues in the other jurisdictions, thereby triggering a positive ex-
ternality that distorts the Leviathan’s tax rate choice in contrast to the centrally planned
optimum. Each regional Leviathan government thus chooses ineﬃciently low tax rates in
such that centrally coordinated tax setting would raise revenues for all regions. Brennan and
Buchanan (1980), however, explicitly dismiss that possibility of collusion, accentuating the
welfare-enhancing eﬀects of decentralised taxation by reducing the wasteful activities and
thus increasing citizens’ welfare.22
When the government is assumed to be a Leviathan only to a certain degree and benev-
19Boadway and Wildasin (1984).
20Wildasin (1989) DePater and Myers (1994) or Bucovetsky et al. (1998).
21Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002).
22In fact, Wilson (2005) questions the analysis of tax rate choices by Leviathan governments. He argues
that revenue-maximising policymakers have an incentive to choose the (less transparent) amount of public
expenditures rather than tax rates to maximise rents. He asserts that voters choosing a positive tax rate on
interregionally mobile capital may then increase public sector eﬃciency.
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olent otherwise,23 Edwards and Keen (1996) examine the possibility of welfare-increasing
cooperation agreements. They ﬁnd that these are desirable if the marginal excess burden of
taxation exceeds the rise in wasteful expenditure the government incurs for a marginal revenue
increase.24 Parry (2003) aims to quantify the welfare cost of interregional tax competition
and concludes that it will be particularly low when governments are no longer modelled
as perfectly benevolent and will approach zero for pure Leviathans. Zissimos and Wooders
(2005) consider Leviathan governments in a model where public goods serve the regions to
diﬀerentiate themselves from other jurisdictions. If ﬁrms diﬀer in their appreciation of the
public good, governments can use this fact to mitigate tax competition. They show that
within this setting, such an alleviation of the degree of tax competition will reduce eﬃciency.
Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2005) considers the possibility of a ﬁscal equalisation grant scheme for moder-
ate Leviathan governments. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) had argued that such institutions
will provide opportunities for pure Leviathans to collude and thus deter the welfare-enhancing
eﬀects of tax competition. Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2005) supports this argument for pure Leviathans,
yet shows that a redistribution scheme will induce a moderate revenue-maximiser to choose
a lower tax rate than it would otherwise, if the number of competing regions is large and/or
if the incumbents place a high value on voter welfare. Besley and Smart (2007) discuss how
tax competition aﬀects welfare when voters do not know for certain whether their govern-
ments are welfare maximisers in a signalling model with elections and rent-seeking behaviour.
Among other things, they conclude that tax competition will most likely improve welfare if
policymakers are more likely to be benevolent and vice versa. This counterintuitive result
is referred to an improvement of selection processes of the Leviathan policymakers when
these are few in numbers. Janeba and Schjelderup (2009) consider regions competing for
mobile capital and explicitly model the respective election processes. For benevolent gov-
ernments, they ﬁnd that welfare will be lower in an open as opposed to a closed economy,
while the reverse holds true for Leviathan governments, unless the appreciation of the public
good is suﬃciently large. For moderate Leviathans, they further ﬁnd that the respective
legislative bargaining processes further inﬂuence outcomes in such that under a presidential-
congressional regime tax competition will raise voters’ welfare, while under a parliamentary
democratic system the welfare of voters is likely to be reduced due to tax competition, if
voters suﬃciently value the respective public good.
23That assumption may be justiﬁed by the intention of a Leviathan government to be re-elected.
24In a similar direction, Rauscher (1998, 2000) analyses whether tax competition will raise public sector
eﬃciency by reducing the waste of tax revenues and in an extention examines the eﬀect of tax competition
on public sector innovation.
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2.1.2 Federal Tax Competition
In the previous section, a federation was characterised by a number of states competing for
mobile tax base with one overarching, though passive, federal government. Yet, as Keen
(1998) pointed out in his seminal paper, reality calls for the explicit recognition of the federal
level as a player in its own right.25 The earliest contributions in that respect can be traced
back to Cassing and Hillmann (1982), Flowers (1988) or Johnson (1988). Dahlby (1994,
1996), Boadway and Keen (1996), Boadway et al. (1998) and, most prominently, Keen
(1998) brought the focus of research towards an active role of the federal government.
Most of the more recent approaches extend the standard ZMW-model to include another
level of government, as prominently done by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003). By con-
sidering n identical regions, symmetric equilibria that do not distort capital allocation arise
at the regional level, such that the focus of analysis can be restricted to the eﬃciency of
chosen tax rates. The analysis typically considers interdependencies resulting from tax base
overlap.26 That is, upper- and lower level governments each levy a tax on a base that displays
some degree of overlap between the diﬀerent levels. Most models assume tax base congru-
ency, in which case the federal tax base B can be denoted as the sum of the n regional tax
bases bi, that is B =
n∑
i=1
bi. When federal and state governments each raise their own revenue
from taxation, the aggregate tax burden τi prevalent in one region is the sum of the federal
tax rate T 27 and the respective regional tax rate ti, such that τi = T + ti.
Next to the previously characterised horizontal externalites at the regional level, each
region’s choice will also aﬀect the federal tax base, which the regional policymaker does not
25The simultaneous taxation of the same tax base by two levels of government is relevant to the tax
systems of many countries. Next to the federal level, Canadian provinces, Swiss cantons and the U.S. states
impose their own corporate tax. The co-existence of the local business tax and the federal corporate tax
in Germany are another example, although there is no perfect tax base overlap. See also section 5.2 for a
further discussion.
26This survey will focus on such approaches. Other models consider the eﬀects of tax deduction schemes
between diﬀerent levels of government, in which typically a single regional government is included, such that
only vertical externalities occur. See, for example, Dahlby et al. (2000) who discuss the optimal deduction of
regional from federal taxes in order to internalise the vertical externality triggered by a regional tax hike. In
an extention of a spatial competition model developed by Salop (1979), Flochel and Madies (2002) ﬁnd that
deductibility of the regional from the national tax load will lead to the vertical externality triggered at the
regional level being intensiﬁed: A regional tax hike not only triggers a vertical externality at the federal level
by individuals relocating their investments, it also leads to the amounts deductible from the federal tax load
to increase. Wrede (2002) analyses the reverse case, but generates analogous results. Additionally, Flochel
and Madies (2002) extend the scope to include several regional governments and ﬁnd that deductibility of
regional taxes reduces the horizontal elasticity of the tax base. Regions will thus gain tax setting power such
that they further increase the impact of the vertical externality.
27It is thereby implicitly assumed that the federal authorities set one uniform tax across all regions.
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account for. Depending on whether capital supply is ﬁxed within the federation or has the
opportunity of being relocated abroad, the impact of a regional tax hike on federal tax base
will be characterised by
Bti =
n∑
i=1
biti ≤ 0.
That is, in a closed economy, for a given regional tax hike capital will relocate between regions
until its net return is equal across the federation and no vertical externality will occur. If cap-
ital can be relocated abroad or is in some other way endogenised as a function of tax rates,28
a vertical externality is triggered by narrowing the federal tax base. Pointing towards ineﬃ-
ciently high regional taxation, it might attenuate the horizontal externality triggered at the
regional level and even result in ineﬃciently high consolidated tax rates. The welfare eﬀects
again hinge on whether the governments are assumed to be benevolent29 or Leviathans.30
The additional recognition of the vertical externality thereby points towards a possible rise
of welfare through an increase in public good provision for benevolent governments or a loss
of welfare by reducing the extent to which tax competition curbs the revenue-maximising
Leviathan governments’ intentions.
The results further hinge on the timing of decision-making. That is, while regions are
typically assumed to engage in Nash-competition, the federal government can either act si-
multaneously with the regions, as modelled by Grazzini and Petretto (2007) or Wrede (1996),
or it can act as a Stackelberg leader, as modelled, for example, by Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002, 2003). If it plays Nash, it will choose its tax rate eﬃciently given state taxation. If it
is a Stackelberg leader, the federal government will perfectly anticipate the tax rate choices
of the following regions (who take the federal tax rate as given) and adapt its tax choice
accordingly. It may set its tax rate higher or lower than in the Nash equilibrium in order to
induce regional policymakers to choose eﬃcient levels of taxation. That will in turn hinge
on the strategic relationship of tax rates at both levels. If they are strategic substitutes,
federal taxation will tend to be higher than in the Nash equilibrium, and lower in the case
of strategic complementarity. The respective welfare eﬀects of the resulting equilibria again
depend on whether governments are assumed to be benevolent or Leviathans.
28For example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003) or Grazzini and Petretto (2007) model the supply of
capital by means of the propensity for savings S in contrast to consumption, which hinges on the net return
to capital ρ, such that S = S(ρ), where ρ is in turn a function of the eﬀective capital tax burden.
29Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004), Wilson (2003) or Madies (2008) develop approaches with welfare-
maximising decision-makers.
30As modelled, for example, by Flowers (1988), Wrede (1996, 2000) or Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003).
Wigger and Wartha (2004) consider the case of a moderate Leviathan government.
18
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
Benevolent Governments
With policymakers aiming to maximise voters’ welfare, jurisdictions at each level ﬁnance the
provision of public goods through the revenues generated from taxation. Public goods pro-
vided at the federal or regional level are typically assumed to be perfect substitutes.31 Federal
governments are assumed to provide their funds equally among the regions, in correspondence
with the share each region’s population has in the country’s total size. Hence, each regional
government incorporates only 1
n
th of the impact its decision has on federal budgets, with the
resulting vertical externality pointing towards ineﬃciently high taxation.32 The eﬃciency
of regional tax rates then depends on which eﬀect (horizontal or vertical) dominates. An
increase of overall welfare following a coordinated tax hike at the regional level implies that
regional tax rates will be chosen ineﬃciently low in equilibrium. The reverse points towards
ineﬃciently high regional tax rates and the dominance of vertical externalities.
The most widely recognised contribution considering welfare-maximising governments in
the context of federal tax competition is by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) who consider
a two-level government with n jurisdictions each inhabited by a single individual.33 They
conclude that whether or not the vertical or the horizontal externality will dominate, hinges
on the relative appreciation for consumption of public and private goods, which follow the
usual Inada-conditions. Furthermore, the result is driven by the elasticity of tax base with
respect to the prevalent tax burden, that is, the interest elasticity of savings and capital
demand with respect to the interest rate. It is shown that for inelastic savings, the horizontal
externality will dominate and vice versa. Wilson (2003) pointed out that if only one region
is considered at the lower level, with local and federal public goods being perfect substitutes,
the ﬁrst-best centrally planned optimum for consolidated tax rates can be achieved by the
central government choosing T such that τ is eﬃcient. For that to be the case, it is irrelevant
whether the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader or plays Nash. In a variation
of the model by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), Madies (2008) examines capital taxation
if a productive public good is provided. He ﬁnds that horizontal externalities may then
result in ineﬃciently high provision, given that next to the well-known positive horizontal
externality a tax hike in one region will trigger a negative horizontal externality in such that
the resulting higher level of productive good provision may in turn attract capital into that
federation and thereby reduce the other regions’ tax base. If that latter eﬀect dominates, the
horizontal externalities point towards ineﬃciently high taxation, such that horizontal and
vertical externalities point in the same direction and may aggravate each other.
31See, for example, Keen (1998), p. 478.
32For instance, be referred to Keen (1998) or Hindriks and Myles (2006), p. 579.
33Earlier approaches were formulated by Dahlby (1996) for commodity taxation or Sobel (1997) in a rather
general essay on tax base overlap, where only one lower-level decision-maker is considered.
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The degree of international capital market integration is considered by Wrede (2002),
who examines the two polar cases of perfect integration as opposed to a closed economy.
In the perfectly integrated small economy, where capital tax base is perfectly mobile and
the net return on capital is deﬁned over the world-market interest rate, strong bottom-up
vertical externalities occur as opposed to the horizontal externalities, which vanish. For the
reverse case of a closed economy, only horizontal and no vertical externalities occur, given
that the capital stock is ﬁxed within the federation. Wilson (2003) draws a line between
these results and those by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), in such that the case of perfect
capital market integration is similar to that of perfect elasticity of savings with respect to
the interest rate. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2004) themselves extend their previous model to
analyse how a variation in the number of regions within the federation inﬂuences the results.
They ﬁnd that, whichever the equilibrium outcome (ineﬃciently high or low tax rates, that
is), an increase in the number of competing states will further intensify that ineﬃciency, such
that welfare will be reduced.
Leviathan Governments
For Leviathan governments, policymakers again care only about their own revenues and
thereby neglect the external tax base eﬀect triggered by the chosen tax regime with the
resulting externalities again pointing in opposite directions.
Flowers (1988) was the ﬁrst to point towards possible ineﬃciencies resulting from a co-
occupation of tax base between diﬀerent levels of revenue-maximising governments. She
stated that by abstracting from possible horizontal externalities, aggregate taxation will be
too high. Wigger and Wartha (2004) also exclude horizontal externalities by considering only
one government at each level. They examine moderate Leviathans and ﬁnd that tax rates
and public good provision will be ineﬃciently high, such that a drop in tax rates will raise
tax revenues. The provision of public goods will be distorted in such that the government
imposing the lower tax rate will have a greater incentive to overprovide the public good given
that it underrates the MCF more than the other level government. Wrede (1996, 2002)
examines whether a federation of Leviathans will always ﬁnd itself in an equilibrium with
ineﬃciently high tax rates if lower-level interregional competition is included. He concludes
that a higher elasticity of the tax base and international competition for tax base then
function by limiting the probability of the federation ending up on the negatively sloped side
of the Laﬀer curve. He also examines the extinction of interregional tax competition through
the creation of a tax cartel at the regional level. Equilibrium is then characterised by the
respective vertical externalities only. Wrede (2000) considers Leviathan federations in which
expenditures for a public production good are a means to expand the tax base. He ﬁnds
that taxes will be too high, while expenditures will be too low if both levels of government
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provide the public good.
In a widely recognised paper, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) characterise and identify the
respective externalities triggered at each level. They show that for Leviathan governments,
whether or not consolidated tax rates will be ineﬃciently high or low hinges on the elasticity
of the tax base (which they endogenise with respect to the interest on savings) as well as
the relative strategic interaction of federal and regional tax rates. Several variations of
that approach consider how the intensity of interregional tax competition in a federal setting
aﬀects the equilibrium. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003) themselves raise the number of regions
in order to intensify tax competition. Referring to an earlier version of that paper, Wrede
(1996) examines how the assumption of horizontally perfectly mobile capital changes the
results. Flochel and Madies (2002) reduce international mobility costs for companies and
further discuss the eﬀect of a possible deductibility of regional tax loads from the federal tax
burden as a limit to interregional capital mobility. All studies reach the same conclusion:
Namely, that an increase in international tax competition will raise consolidated revenues.
The intuition behind this result is the following: For intensiﬁed interregional tax competition,
each single region’s tax-setting power is reduced and converges to zero, such that the relative
impact of the federal government’s decisions rises. It will thus approach the outcome reached
by a central planner, thereby maximising consolidated revenues through the appropriate
choice of T .
Eﬃciency Gains
Various possible measures for eﬃciency gains in a federal setting have been examined. For
one, following the result of ineﬃciently low tax rates at the regional level, regional budgets
could be raised by a coordinated tax hike of all regions.34 If the federal government can
perfectly dispose of federal transfer schemes, it has a means to install the second-best eﬃcient
outcome.35
Overtaxation of a common tax base can be compared to the excessive usage of a com-
mon,36 such that the application of a Pigouvian tax37 or the deﬁnition of property rights38
34This will be a feasible solution from the perspective of a Leviathan government. If governments are
benevolent and the federal tax base is elastic, the eﬀect of collusion hinges on whether overall welfare could
be raised by a hike in consolidated tax rates. See, for example, Wrede (2000) or Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002, 2003).
35See, for example, Keen (1998), Wrede (2002) or Wilson (2003). Boadway and Keen (1996) had previously
pointed out that the explicit recognition of federal structure inﬂuences the design of a transfer scheme by
possibly making transfers from the states to the federal level eﬃcient, instead of the - typically assumed -
other way around.
36See, for example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
37See Pigou (1947).
38See Coase (1960).
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may be justiﬁed. In that respect, Dahlby (1996) recommends the right for the benevolent
federal government to impose a tax on regional tax revenues, where the respective rate would
be chosen in order for the MCF perceived by the regions to equal the SMCF. Sobel (1997)
suggests for the regional governments to be given the exclusive right to tax, subject to the
condition that a certain minimum level of revenues must be generated. He thereby sees the
regions engage in competition for the tax base by choosing the most eﬃcient tax system,
rather than the lowest tax rates. Keen (1998) suggests that a property right for taxation of
a common tax base could be attributed to one level of government,39 with the obligation to
distribute revenues across the federation, thereby realising the ﬁrst-best solution of a central
planner.
2.1.3 International Federal Tax Competition
Over the years, the literature on tax competition has produced a multitude of papers on
the theoretical consequences of international competition for mobile capital, whose principles
apply just as well to lower-level tax competition within a federation.40 With the explicit
recognition of (multiple-layer) federal structure, the inclusion of those ﬁndings into the in-
ternational tax competition literature was only a small step.
In that respect, Wrede (2002)41 has developed a general model of two identical Leviathan
federations42 engaging in Nash competition for internationally mobile tax base by choice
of a (distortive) tax rate.43 All levels of government in both countries are myopic and the
worldwide provision of tax base is elastic. Within one federation the same vertical and
horizontal externalities arise as described in the previous section. In addition, positive cross-
national horizontal externalities are identiﬁed. That is, each country neglects that for a
tax hike the other country’s tax base will expand by capital relocating to where its net
return is highest. Wrede (2002) then examines the revenue-eﬀect of domestic in contrast to
cross-national collusion. Cooperation agreements within the federation will then internalise
the inner-federal externalities, but, obviously, not those across the borders. The revenue-
eﬀect of a coordinated reduction in the consolidated domestic tax essentially hinges on the
strategic interaction of domestic and foreign tax rates. It will be positive if they are strategic
substitutes or suﬃciently weak complements.44 Across-country cooperation consisting of
39The central level, that is, if several regions are subject to horizontal tax competition. If only one region
is considered and no horizontal eﬀects occur, that property right could be attributed to any of the levels.
40See section 2.1.1.
41In a subsection, but less extensive, also Wrede (1996).
42At some point of the analysis, for simpliﬁcation purposes, one of the countries is assumed to be unitary.
43Notwithstanding that it abstains from the consideration of a speciﬁc tax, the approach can be easily
applied to capital taxation.
44In the latter case, tax payers will also proﬁt from such collusion.
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coordinated tax hikes will be revenue-increasing if the worldwide tax base is suﬃciently
inelastic.45
For welfare-maximising competing federations, Wrede (1997, 2002) analyses an extention
of the ZMW-model. Mutually myopic governments are assumed to choose tax rates and the
amount of expenditures under tax base congruency and perfect substitutability of federal and
regional public goods. The vertical externalities then tend to dominate within the federations.
The further resulting cross-border horizontal externalities pointing towards ineﬃciently low
tax rates will, however, dominate in total, such that world-wide tax rates and levels of public
good provision will be ineﬃciently low.
Grazzini and Petretto (2007) consider an extention of the model developed by Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2002)46 in which a federal country competes with a unitary country.
They develop a three-stage game in which the upper-level government in the federation
acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the regions and simultaneously engages in Nash-
competition with the national government in the unitary country.47 Unlike Wrede (2002),
they not only identify cross-national horizontal externalities, they also characterise cross-
national vertical externalities from the national unitary government to the regions of the
federation. They ﬁnd that under speciﬁc assumptions regarding the strategic across-country
relationship of national (and regional) tax rates, the consolidated tax rate in the federation
will be ineﬃciently low and tax rates in the unitary state will be ineﬃciently high.48
Through the chosen tax rates, the relative size of vertical and horizontal ﬁscal externali-
ties in a federation is dependent on the share of federal and regional expenditures for public
goods.49 Wilson and Janeba (2005) develop a model in which the degree of decentralisation
serves as a strategic tool in competing for internationally mobile capital. The domestic coun-
try chooses the amount of centrally provided public goods, such that horizontal externalities
are dominated by the vertical externalities. The consolidated tax rate will thus rise, which
will shift the domestic reaction curve upwards, along the foreign country’s reaction curve,
45If the worldwide tax base is ﬁxed, the Leviathan governments will collude to choose the highest possible
tax rate.
46See section 2.1.2.
47In the ﬁrst stage of the game, national governments decide upon their tax rates. In stage two, the regions
choose their tax rates in a Nash game, taking those of the upper-level governments as given, and in the third
stage the citizens choose how much to save and where to invest their savings. Government revenues are then
distributed among the citizens in the form of lump-sum transfers.
48These ineﬃciencies can be traced back to the decision-makers misjudging the degree of capital mobility
and the sensitivity of the net return on capital to given tax changes. Neither of the national-level governments
is assumed to anticipate the strategic reaction of the other national-level governments in response to a tax
hike. The tax-induced loss of capital tax base is then overestimated as well as the reduction (increase) in the
other country’s tax rate, if the latter is a capital importer (exporter). The results are also essentially driven
by the assumption that the unitary country neglects the tax rate responses at the federation’s regional level.
49See, for example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).
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such that the foreign country’s optimal tax rate will rise, and capital will again be attracted
to the domestic country. The same reasoning holds for the foreign country, and it is shown
that both countries’ welfare will rise as a consequence of the mitigated underprovision of
public goods.
2.2 Empirical Approaches
In the literature on federal tax competition, empirical work has particularly focused on the
identiﬁcation of strategic interaction between jurisdictions. While one strand focuses on the
horizontal interaction between jurisdictions at the same institutional level, a more recent
ﬁeld of empirical work is driven by the theoretical implications of the explicit recognition of
a country’s federal structure and aims to identify the interdependence of tax setting across
diﬀerent levels of government. This section is setup by ﬁrst giving a brief overview of the
econometric methods and model speciﬁcation issues regarding the identiﬁcation of strategic
tax interaction. Subsequently, the existing studies aiming to identify interregional competi-
tion between jurisdictions at the same level are reviewed, followed by a survey of studies that
extend their scope to include vertical interdependencies - where these may either include both
horizontal and vertical interaction or allow for only the latter.50 The last subsection deals
with another issue relevant for the analysis of federal tax competition, that is, the question
whether governments can be perceived as Leviathans or as benevolent by characterising the
approaches taken to identify Leviathan behaviour and discussing the generated results.
2.2.1 Estimating Federal Tax Competition
The empirical literature on interregional tax competition aims to identify correlations between
the ﬁscal choice variables of diﬀerent jurisdictions applying spatial econometrics methods.
The empirical task is then to estimate reaction functions of a strategy variable (here: the
chosen tax rate) in jurisdiction i with respect to the vector of tax rates chosen in other
jurisdictions. Its slope then characterises the strategic interdependence of choices, with a
positive coeﬃcient implying a complementary relationship between the respective tax rates,
while the reverse is the case for substitutability.
While a signiﬁcant slope coeﬃcient points towards the existence of horizontal interaction,
the latter may be attributed mainly to two causes. For one, horizontal externalities are
considered to arise as a consequence of tax base mobility. A jurisdiction is thus aﬀected
by the choice of a strategy variable in other jurisdictions in such that its tax base will
50Given that the existing empirical literature is not as abundant as the theoretical contributions, the
focus is not restricted to studies on capital taxation, but instead those considering excise or personal income
taxation are included as well.
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change in response to that. In our case, capital investments will shift with respect to the tax
burden prevalent in one jurisdiction. Other approaches, particularly based in the work by
Salmon (1987) or Besley and Case (1995), relate the existence of externalities to informational
asymmetries in a principal-agent setting. The yardstick competition literature sees the source
of tax interactions in a government’s attempt to maximise its chances of being re-elected by
copying successful neighbours’ policies.51 In order to distinguish these two sources of tax
mimicking behaviour, one might further control for whether jurisdiction i’s tax base depends
on the tax rate choices made in i as well as in all other jurisdictions, which would indicate
for tax competition to trigger the observed eﬀects. On the other hand, by controlling for
an impact of tax rates on electoral outcomes, yardstick competition may be identiﬁed as the
source of interdependencies.52 Some authors speciﬁcally try to pinpoint which of the two
eﬀects their regression is likely to capture, while others simply test for the existence of tax
mimicking behaviour. Restricting its attention to strategic interaction resulting from tax
base competition, this survey will thus exclude those papers that speciﬁcally characterise
yardstick competition as the driving force behind their results.
Evidence of vertical interdependence is sought by estimating the slope of the reaction
function between upper- and lower-level tax rates. That relationship tends to be of relevance
particularly for the interpretation of theoretical results, in which the question whether or not
tax rates are set eﬃciently often hinges on whether federal and state tax rates are strategic
complements or substitutes.53
Thus, the tax rate of one jurisdiction i is typically regressed on the tax rate of the
other jurisdictions at the same level and, if vertical interdependence is also considered, on
the federal tax rate. Jurisdictional ﬁxed eﬀects are typically controlled for as well as a set
of socio-economic characteristics of jurisdiction i and a set of factors common across all
jurisdictions.54 Each of the other jurisdictions’ tax rates is further assigned a speciﬁc weight,
such that a central issue concerns the speciﬁcation of the appropriate weight matrix, for
which several approaches have been brought forward. The most widely used is a weighting
scheme according to shared borders. Such a weight wij may be dichotomous,
55 with wij = 1
when region i and region j share a border and wij = 0 otherwise, or non-dichotomous in such
that the total length of shared borders relative to a country’s size is considered and then
normalised to one. Recent contributions have formulated more elaborate weighting schemes.
For instance, a multi-regional approach is applied to U.S. states by Rork and Wagner (2008),
51See also Case et al. (1993), Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) or Bordignon et al. (2003). This literature is
surveyed in Madies et al. (2004).
52Brueckner (2003) had pointed towards these identiﬁcation problems. Building on that, Revelli (2005)
devotes an entire survey to this issue.
53See, for example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) or Grazzini and Petretto (2007).
54See, for example, Madies et al. (2004) for a more detailed overview.
55See Brueckner (2003).
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who assign weights with respect to the population size of the competing state and also
group certain states into regions. Weights are then further assigned under the assumption
that cross-regional interactions will be diﬀerent to those occuring within a region. Similarly,
Gerard et al. (2010) apply a weighting scheme in which Belgian municipalities are sorted
into regions and diﬀering weights are assigned with respect to inner-regional or cross-regional
border sharing.
Further issues stem from endogeneity problems. For one, given the mutual interdepen-
dence of the strategy variables, the vector of tax rates chosen by the other jurisdictions may
itself be endogenous and thus correlated with the error term. The error term may further
include spatially dependent omitted variables.56 Typically, these issues are solved by the
application of maximum-likelihood (ML) methods57 or by the implementation of an instru-
mental variable approach as suggested by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) or Kelejian and
Prucha (1998).58
The included vector of jurisdiction-speciﬁc characteristics may also be correlated with the
error term. The arising endogeneity problems can be solved by appropriate speciﬁcation of
instruments for the respective control variables, or they may be circumvented by the use of
panel data, which may also help to deal with spatial error dependence, as pointed out by
Brueckner (2003). This approach was taken, for example, by Revelli (2001) or, more recently,
Gerard et al. (2010).
2.2.2 Interregional Tax Competition
A vast array of literature on interregional tax mimicking behaviour has been produced, among
which the majority of studies uses European datasets, with only some studies on the United
States or Canada. Since excellent surveys of the previous literature have been given by
Brueckner (2003) or Madies et al. (2004), the focus of this work lies on the more recent
contributions.
Competition Over Tax Rates Within a Country
For American data, most studies focus on tax interaction between states or between local-
level counties and municipalities. In earlier studies, Ladd (1992) or Brueckner and Saavedra
(2001) have found evidence of positive tax interaction for municipal property tax rates in
56In that context, Revelli (2008) points towards the presence of correlated shocks, such as an increase in
federal transfers to all regions, which incurs regional governments to reduce their tax rates, not to be confused
with evidence of strategic interaction between regional decision-makers.
57These are applied, among others, by Sole´-Olle´ (2003), Allers and Elhorst (2005) or Rork and Wagner
(2008).
58See, for example, Feld and Reulier (2009), Devereux et al. (2008) or Edmark and Agren (2008).
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the United States. For panel data on the property and sales taxes in U.S. states between
1993 and 2003, Hill (2008) examines whether agglomeration has an impact on tax setting.
He ﬁnds a complementary relationship between tax rates across states as well as evidence
that agglomeration in fact leads to an overall higher tax burden and a lower likelihood of
tax mimicking behaviour. Rork and Wagner (2008) examine interstate excise (cigarette and
general sales) tax competition in the USA for the time from 1967 to 2002. They ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcients for interstate tax interaction and further conjecture that the latter not only
hinges on the mobility of tax base, but also on the structure of regional interrelations within
the country. They speciﬁcally ﬁnd that the direction and the degree of tax competition varies
signiﬁcantly over speciﬁc regions. Deskins and Hill (2010) survey panel data on several U.S.
state taxes in an attempt to pinpoint whether the interdependence of state tax rates has var-
ied over time. They conﬁrm the existence of strategic complementarity of tax rates and ﬁnd
signiﬁcant evidence that the interregional sensitivity of state personal income tax rates has
in fact systematically diminished over time. They are, however, unable to generate evidence
of such time trends for the corporate income tax. Crowley and Sobel (2010) analyse panel
data for property taxation in municipalities, counties and school districts in Pennsylvania,
in which the number of regions at the respective level serves as a proxy for its degree of
decentralisation. They examine the interrelations of tax competition, revenue-maximising
government behaviour and spatial interdependence of tax rates in municipalities and coun-
ties to ﬁnd that decentralisation and thus a higher degree of interregional tax competition
reduces tax rates. Their results for school districts, which are highly decentralised, however,
provide evidence of strong interaction, yet signiﬁcantly higher tax rates. The authors de-
duce that spatial correlation between tax rates as an indicator of tax competition between
regions needs to be seen with caution, given that it might as well imply evidence of collusion
activities, which might in turn drive taxation upwards.59
For a sample of Brazilian states between 1985 and 2001, deMello (2008) ﬁnds signiﬁcant
evidence of strategic complementarity in the choice of the value-added tax. He further ﬁnds
that these interactions are more pronounced among states belonging to the same geographic
region and that one state, namely, Bahia, in fact acts as a Stackelberg leader.
Various studies exist for Europe, given the richness of data and the variety of institu-
tional reforms and individual countries’ regulation. One strand of research is driven by
the decentralised structure of European countries. Among the more recent contributions,
Vandenbusschee et al. (2005) ﬁnd evidence that Belgian regions compete over the eﬀective
corporate tax rate for a time period from 1993-2002. Geys (2006) examines Flemish tax set-
ting for the year 2000. He argues that with respect to tax base mobility, the ratio of the tax
level to the amount of government spending in one municipality rather than only the tax rate
59See also section 2.2.4.
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may inﬂuence location choice. With a thus created index, he draws the conclusion that sig-
niﬁcant competition for tax base between municipalities does exist in such that a favourable
tax-expenditure ratio of one municipality is likely to positively inﬂuence that ratio in other
municipalities.60 For a panel of Belgian municipalities, Gerard et al. (2010) explore the sig-
niﬁcance of interregional diﬀerences for interactions in setting local tax rate surcharges. They
ﬁnd that decision-makers react speciﬁcally towards property tax rate surcharges set by their
closest neighbours rather than all other Belgian municipalities. Further, the results indicate
that tax competition is more intense among municipalities within the Brussels region. Their
ﬁndings validate the result of Belgian income tax rates as strategic complements established
by Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) and Richard, Tulkens and Verdonck (2002), but contradict
these authors’ positive results for the local property tax surcharge by detecting instead an
inverse relationship.
For data on Swedish local income tax policies between 1993 and 2006, Edmark and Agren
(2008) test for tax mimicking behaviour and explicitly try to verify whether their results are
driven by yardstick competition or tax competition. They ﬁnd strong evidence of tax rates
being positively spatially correlated, driven by mobile tax base rather than possible election
outcomes.
Feld and Reulier (2009) examine competition over income tax rates among Swiss cantons
for panel data from 1984 and 1999. They ﬁnd a positive relationship for income tax rate
reactions between the cantons. Hereby, they support previous ﬁndings for Swiss data.61
Reulier and Rocaboy (2009) test for strategic complementarity in the setting of tax rates
between French regions, speciﬁcally aiming to discriminate between yardstick- or tax base
competition-driven behaviour. Their results suggest that tax mimicking between French
regional governments exists and can be attributed to the former if the tax burden is carried
by the voters, whereas it can be attributed to the mobility of tax base if the tax is imposed
on ﬁrms. Charlot and Paty (2010) study the impact of agglomeration on tax competition
in France for 2002 and ﬁnd evidence of complementarity in tax rates, but do not detect a
signiﬁcant relationship between tax rates and the population density within a region. For
urban jurisdictions, they further ﬁnd a positive relation between the capital tax rate and the
prevailing capital stock, which they attribute to a taxable agglomeration rent, as brought
forward by new economic geography models.62
Relatively little evidence exists on tax competition in Germany. Buettner (1999, 2001)
60That result may also be seen as indicative of the relevance of laboratory federalism approaches outlined
in section 1.2.
61See Feld and Kirchgaessner (2001, 2002) or Feld and Reulier (2005).
62Their ﬁndings contribute to a fairly extensive literature on French tax setting, whose earlier contributions,
for example, by Jayet et al. (2002) or Feld et al. (2002), were aﬃrmative of the tax competition hypothesis.
See Madies et al. (2004) for more details.
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examines business tax setting interactions between German municipalities for the time be-
tween 1980 and 1996, where he ﬁnds evidence of tax mimicking behaviour with larger regions
setting higher tax rates on average. Subsequently, Buettner (2003) speciﬁcally tests for tax
base mobility as a source of tax mimicking behaviour between German municipalities from
1980 till 2000 and conﬁrms his hypothesis.
Competition Over Tax Rates Across Countries
Another strand of literature on European data is driven by the EU integration and enlarge-
ment process and aims to characterise strategic tax rate interactions among member states.
For a data panel on 11 Western European states between 1970 and 1999, Redoano (2007) con-
cludes that there is positive strategic interdependence between corporate tax levels and sees
that European countries speciﬁcally interact with their large competitors, which they use as a
point of reference. Further, tax mimicking appears to be particularly pronounced before join-
ing the European Union, while it becomes less signiﬁcant after membership is accomplished.
Taking the EU enlargement as a point of departure, Cassette and Paty (2008) examine the
relationship between the former EU-15 and Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC)
for the period between 1995 and 2005. They ﬁnd evidence of pronounced complementary
tax interaction within Western European countries, but less pronounced strategic interaction
among the CEEC. Their results also point towards interregional competition between East
and West.
Finally, some authors have used the observed increase in international capital market
integration to study international strategic tax interactions. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2003)
examine European and U.S. tax setting to ﬁnd evidence of tax competition, in which the
United States act as a Stackelberg leader. They further conclude that tax competition among
European countries has become less intense, while it has gained momentum between the U.S.
and Europe. Devereux et al. (2008) aim to ﬁnd proof of competition over corporate tax
rates among OECD countries. They estimate upward-sloping reaction functions for OECD
countries generated from a theoretical model showing that the mobility of tax base depends
on an industry’s relocation cost. They conclude that strategic interaction only takes place
among open countries, in which relaxed capital controls, leading to increased competition
for mobile tax base, trigger a reduction in tax rates. Kammas (2009) examines a 1982-2000
panel dataset for OECD countries to ﬁnd a positive response of capital tax rates within the
countries towards those set in other countries and a negative reponse of capital tax rates
towards public investment spending.
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Tax Base Mobility
In addition to the characterisation of tax reaction functions, some authors try to establish
a relationship between the mobility of tax base and the level of tax rates prevailing in a
jurisdiction. Interstate tax competition with respect to the degree of mobility of the tax
base is examined by Rork (2003) for ﬁve major state tax instruments in the United States
over a time period from 1967 through 1996. He supports the tax competition hypothesis
with his results stating that the more mobile the tax base of a state (as, for example, motor
fuel or tobacco sales and corporate income taxes as opposed to personal income and general
sales taxes), the more sensitive its response towards a tax hike in the neighbouring regions
will be. He further conjectures that there is evidence of complementarity for tax rates on
mobile bases and indications of substitutability for immobile ones. Mintz and Smart (2004)
use panel data on corporate taxation in Canadian provinces between 1986 and 1999. They
ﬁnd evidence of higher state tax rates reducing the respective tax base, and of ﬁrms with
an opportunity for income shifting reacting signiﬁcantly more elastically towards changes
in tax rates. Carlsen et al. (2005) examine Norwegian municipalities and their strategic
behaviour with respect to the mobility of ﬁrms. For that, the degree of ﬁrm mobility at
the local level is explicitly incorporated into an approach developed and later published by
Devereux et al. (2008).63 They establish an inverse relationship between the mobility of tax
base and the level of infrastructure fees imposed on ﬁrms at the regional level. Using OECD
panel data, Winner (2005) concludes that for the time period of 1965-2000, an increase in
capital mobility pushes labour taxation upwards, while having an inverse eﬀect on capital
taxation. He further ﬁnds that the larger a country, the more likely it is to have an overall
higher tax level. The integration of capital markets and its impact on EU wealth and tax
levels for the time period between 1970 and 1996 is scrutinised by Mendoza and Tesar (2005)
within a macroeconomic framework. Their evidence implies that while capital tax rates
were only slightly driven downwards (except in the UK, where the reduction was somewhat
more pronounced), labour tax rates were subject to sharp increases (except in the UK,
where it changed only marginally). The impact of monetary and economic EU integration
on corporate tax competition is also examined by Karkalakos and Makris (2008) for a time
span between 1975 and 2005. A positive correlation is observed between corporate tax rates
and economic integration, while the former is negative for monetary integration. Davies and
Voget (2009) ask whether the recent EU enlargement has in fact intensiﬁed tax competition
for unbalanced panel data over a time period from 1980 through 2005. They conclude that
tax competition among EU members is more intense than between members and other states.
63See above.
30
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
2.2.3 Federal Tax Competition
Given the theoretically driven explicit recognition of federal structure, it was only a matter of
time until its results were sought to be empirically veriﬁed by aiming to detect an interaction
of upper- and lower-level tax rates.
Vertical Tax Rate Interaction Within a Country
The earliest empirical study can be found in Besley and Rosen (1998). They examine the
interaction of federal and state level gasoline tax rates in the United States over a time period
from 1975 till 1989. Their approach only accounts for vertical interactions and does not allow
for possible horizontal eﬀects among the lower-level governments. The generated results point
towards a positive relationship between federal and state taxes. Various subsequent papers
have analysed gasoline and cigarette taxation at the U.S. federal and state level. Devereux
et al. (2007) consider panel data from 1977-1997 controlling for the elasticity of tax base
and cross-border shopping. For the taxation of cigarettes, they ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive
and large horizontal eﬀect, while the vertical eﬀects are insigniﬁcant. Gasoline tax rates
are driven upwards by vertical tax interaction, while horizontal interaction is not signiﬁcant.
These results correspond with the predictions from their theoretical model arguing that the
vertical externality is likely to be more signiﬁcant, the more elastic the tax base. They refer
to empirical evidence suggesting that this is the case for gasoline rather than cigarettes. For a
panel from 1975-2001, Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) examine U.S. cigarette taxation. While
the regression results covering the entire period are insigniﬁcant, their results on the time
between 1982-2001 suggest that states are likely to react inversely towards a tax rate hike at
the federal level. Miyamoto (2009) estimates reaction functions for gasoline and cigarette tax
rates. He ﬁnds very little evidence of horizontal tax competition and on average a moderate
positive relationship between federal and state level for both taxes. The results on vertical
interaction are somewhat more pronounced for cigarette taxation and the sign and magnitude
of the slopes of the reaction functions diﬀer across states.
Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (2001) examine personal income and general sales taxation
at the state and federal level in the United States over a time period between 1987 and
1996 and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive interdependence of both state level tax rates with federal
taxes. Wu and Hendrick (2009) examine property tax rates set in municipalities (lower level)
and in counties or school districts (upper level) in Florida between 2000 and 2004. Their
results conﬁrm the existence of horizontal and vertical tax interactions. Namely, they ﬁnd
positive horizontal interactions at the municipal level and an inverse reaction of municipal-
level tax rates towards county-level tax rates, while the latter is positive with respect to
school district-level tax rates.
Rizzo (2010) develops an approach to estimate vertical and horizontal tax interaction
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eﬀects for general sales and tobacco excise tax rates in the United States and Canada between
1984 and 1994. He ﬁnds evidence of complementarity between upper and lower level tax
rates. His results further indicate that an increase in the federal tax rate may be eﬃciency-
enhancing and might oﬀset the tax competition eﬀects at the lower level by reducing the
sensitivity of lower-level tax rate responses to horizontal tax competition. Using a proxy for
excise taxation of production goods derived from a dataset between 1970 and 1997, Crisan
(2007) examines vertical and horizontal tax competition eﬀects in Canadian provinces. His
results strongly support the existence of vertical externalities and complementarity between
federal and provincial tax rates. The evidence on horizontal tax competition is mixed, with
the slopes of the provincial-level reaction functions being either positive or negative, and not
all of them being signiﬁcant. He does, however ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant indications that all
provinces react positively towards the tax rate chosen in the province of Alberta, pointing
towards a somewhat leading function within the Canadian provinces.
The regional pattern of municipal corporate property tax rates within British Columbia is
examined by Brett and Pinkse (2000). They ﬁnd evidence of horizontal tax competition and
note further that their results point towards the existence of vertical interdependencies with
the state tax rates being driven downwards by a federal tax hike. For Canadian federal and
provincial corporate income tax rates from 1963 through 1996, Hayashi and Boadway (2001)
estimate reaction functions and ﬁnd evidence of vertical and horizontal eﬀects. Precisely, they
ﬁnd an inverse relationship between federal and provincial tax rates and complementarity
for provincial-level tax rates. They further conclude that the results for the province of
Ontario are peculiar in such that tax setting is neither aﬀected by the other provinces nor
by the federal level. Instead, federal taxation exhibits a positive relationship towards the
tax level in Ontario. Finally, Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (2002) estimate an upward-sloping
reaction function of Canadian provincial personal income tax rates towards other provinces’
and federal tax rates for data from 1982 through 1996.
Among the studies considering data from the EU, Revelli (2001) examines property tax
setting in non-metropolitan districts in England for panel data in the 1980s. He is able to
conﬁrm spatial interaction between districts, but ﬁnds no evidence of vertical interdependence
of tax rates. Municipal and department level setting of the local business tax in France in
1995 is explored by Goodspeed and LePrince (2003). Their estimates point towards an
upward-sloping reaction function of the municipalities towards the departments. LePrince et
al. (2007) characterise department (intermediate level) and regional (upper level) government
tax reactions for the case of business taxation by use of a French cross-section from 1995.
Their results suggest that vertical tax interactions are not signiﬁcant, while horizontal tax
interactions at the department level are. They further point out that there is no evidence of
the upper-level tax choices oﬀsetting the ineﬃciencies created at the lower level. For data on
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Swedish local and regional personal income taxation derived from a 1981 - 1990 panel data
set, Andersson et al. (2004) ﬁnd an inverse relationship between tax rates. They further
test for whether the upper-level government is able to internalise the ineﬃciencies triggered
at the lower level and conjecture that this is not the case for local and regional tax rate
choices. Bruelhart and Jametti (2006) use a Swiss panel data set for selected years between
1985 and 2001. Starting from the theoretical result that tax rates at the state level will
decline with an increase of fragmentation if the horizontal externalities dominate at the state
level, and vice versa, they analyse the interdependence of canton-level and municipal-level
personal and corporate tax rates for all of the 26 Swiss cantons with respect to the degree of
fragmentation. Their evidence suggests that on average vertical externalities dominate the
horizontal externalities among the municipalities in each of the Swiss cantons.
Vertical Tax Rate Interaction Across Countries
Goodspeed (2000) aims to identify horizontal and vertical tax competition eﬀects for data
on 13 OECD countries between 1975 and 1984. He ﬁnds that state-level governments react
towards an income tax hike at the federal level by reducing their tax rates. As a proxy
for the mobility of tax base and, thus, international tax competition, he uses state poverty
rates and ﬁnds a positive relationship between those and the level of income tax rates, which
conﬁrms the classical tax competition results. Goodspeed (2002b) supports and enriches his
previous results by further specifying the existence of interaction of vertical and horizontal
eﬀects. He points out that the vertical externality increases with a greater equality of tax
bases across regions, that is, with a lower degree of tax base mobility and, thus, horizontal
tax competition.
2.2.4 Eﬃciency Enhancing Tax Competition
The evaluation of decentralisation or tax competition diﬀers signiﬁcantly depending on
whether governments are assumed to be revenue or welfare maximisers.64 This section aims
to give an overview of the existing studies seeking to empirically validate the assumption of
Leviathan behaviour.
Most of the respective contributions aim to establish a link between the size of government
and the degree of decentralisation.65 Decentralisation will lead to a reduction in the size of
government under the assumption that it reduces the ability of governments to maximise their
own budgets through better possibilities to control the policymakers. Typically, the degree of
decentralisation is proxied by means of one jurisdictional level’s share of expenditure (revenue)
64See section 2.1.
65Other approaches, which will also be discussed further on, examine whether decentralisation has an eﬀect
on public sector eﬃciency or whether elements of direct democracy will reduce public sector size.
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in total government expenditures (revenues) or the total number of jurisdictions at one level.66
Competing views regarding the eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralisation call for a careful speciﬁcation
of the respective regressions. For one, while ﬁscal decentralisation will most likely reduce
central and raise local government budgets, the aggregate eﬀect remains open. Brennan
and Buchanan (1980) suggested for Leviathan governments to be restrained by horizontal
competition for mobile tax base, such that decentralisation will raise welfare by reducing
the overall size of government. On the other hand, their ‘collusion hypothesis’ implies that
this need not be the case. In fact, upper and lower level Leviathan governments have an
incentive to collude and transfer taxation power to the central level in order to circumvent
the restraining tax competition eﬀects, while only expenditures remain decentralised. The
collusion hypothesis thus calls for the careful consideration of expenditure as opposed to
revenue decentralisation. Several studies67 further control for collusion activities by taking
into account the prevalence of federal transfer schemes. In contrast, with reference to an idea
by John Wallis, Oates (1985) asserted that decentralisation may lead to ineﬃciently high
local and also aggregate expenditures given that taxpayers are better able to exert inﬂuence
on their local in contrast to federal-level incumbents, such that the former may feel more
inclined to pursue local projects leaving lower-level expenditures ineﬃciently high. Hence,
an increase of aggregate expenditures following ﬁscal decentralisation neither conﬁrms nor
denies the Leviathan hypothesis.
Empirical studies thus need to analyse the expenditure and the revenue side of diﬀerent
levels of government as well as the aggregate level and carefully account for the contrasting
views and implications of the Leviathan hypothesis, the collusion hypothesis and the Oates-
Wallis hypothesis.
Decentralisation Within a Country
Oates (1985) ﬁrst attempted to empirically verify the existence of a Leviathan government
for cross-sectional data on U.S. state and local level governments in 1977 as well as inter-
national data from 43 countries. Including both state revenue and expenditures as a share
of total government revenue (expenditures) and the number of local jurisdictions to measure
the degree of decentralisation, he establishes no evidence of Leviathan behaviour. For the
same dataset, after varying the measures of the degree of decentralisation and accounting for
heterogeneous preferences across the states, Nelson (1987) ﬁnds a moderately negative rela-
tionship between the size of government and decentralisation. Eberts and Gronberg (1988)
observe a reduction in public sector size as a consequence of ﬁscal decentralisation for 1977
66Other measures, such as the degree of fragmentation or tax competition, have also been developed, which
will be pointed out with regard to the respective studies.
67See, for example, Lalvani (2002) or Chen (2004).
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data on the U.S. county and metropolitan level. For U.S. county cross-sectional data, Forbes
and Zampelli (1989) conclude that public sector size expands with a higher degree of de-
centralisation, which they perceive as contradicting the Leviathan hypothesis. Zax (1989)
ﬁnds evidence in favour of the Leviathan hypothesis for a cross-sectional dataset of U.S.
municipalities from 1982. He states that local level government budgets will be reduced if
decentralisation raises tax competition, while the opposite will be the case if it incurs a loss
of scale economies. With data on the U.S. state level, Marlow (1988) performs a time-series
regression for 1946-1985 with results pointing towards decentralisation reducing the size of
government. Joulfaian and Marlow (1991) measure the impact of the level of decentral-
isation on government budgets for U.S. state, local and federal spending in 1983-1985 to
conﬁrm the Leviathan hypothesis for federal revenues.68 Using Data Envelopment Analysis
to determine the eﬃciency of Minnesotan counties, Nold Hughes and Edwards (2000) ﬁnd
evidence in favour of the Leviathan hypothesis. They use aggregate county property values as
a proxy for public sector eﬃciency. That approach was suggested by Brueckner (1982), who
showed that the Samuelson condition for eﬃcient public good provision is consistent with
the maximisation of aggregate communal property values. That same proxy is applied by
Bates and Santerre (2006), who support the Leviathan hypothesis for cross-sectional data on
municipalities in Connecticut for 1998. They generate the result that public sector eﬃciency
is reduced with higher market power. Stansel (2006) examines municipal-level U.S. data
from 1962 through 1992. For municipal government spending growth over three time periods
(1962-1992, 1962-1982 and 1982-1992), he concludes that it will be limited by more intense
competition. Crowley and Sobel (2010)69 analyse panel data for property tax rates in mu-
nicipalities, counties and school districts in Pennsylvania between 1995 and 2005 to ﬁnd that
decentralisation intensiﬁes interjurisdictional competition and abates tax rates. They fur-
ther ﬁnd evidence of collusion activities between school districts raising the level of tax rates.
Their evidence overall veriﬁes the Leviathan hypothesis and points towards the recognition
of collusion activities not only across levels of government, but also at the same level.
For a panel dataset on Indian state and local governments for selected time periods be-
tween 1990 and 1998, Lalvani (2002) concludes that decentralisation yields a smaller total
and upper-level government size, while it raises that of subnational governments. She further
ﬁnds evidence of collusion activities triggering an increase in expenditures at all levels of
government. Chen (2004) examines ﬁscal decentralisation at the provincial level in China for
68Marlow (1988) had suggested that the inclusion of the national level in order to examine the revenue
eﬀects of decentralisation was of high relevance and had been neglected so far. Joulfaian and Marlow (1991)
argue that while central government may not be subject to Tiebout competition and some of its public goods
may not be possible to provide at the local level, it is just that monopolistic power that is likely to be quite
relevant in testing the Leviathan hypothesis.
69See also section 2.2.2.
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a dataset from 1987 through 2000. The generated results imply that provincial expenditures
will rise as a consequence of stronger ﬁscal decentralisation, which is perceived as a conﬁr-
mation of the Oates-Wallis hypothesis.70 Chen (2004) also ﬁnds evidence that provincial and
central governments are more likely to engage in collusion activities with a higher degree of
decentralisation, which in turn is seen as supportive of the collusion hypothesis.
Several studies exist that examine panel data on Swiss cantons. For the time between 1980
and 1998, Feld and Matsusaka (2003) ﬁnd that direct democracy in the form of referendums
signiﬁcantly reduces the amount of government expenditures, a result which may be seen
as a conﬁrmation of the Leviathan hypothesis. For selected years between 1985 and 2001,
Bruelhart and Jametti (2007) ﬁnd that a higher degree of decentralisation within a canton
entails a reduction of municipal tax rates, concluding that this may be indicative of tax
competition having a restraining eﬀect on Leviathan governments. Feld and Schaltegger
(2009) examine the impact of government fragmentation on revenue and expenditure size
between 1980 and 1998. They ﬁnd that cabinet size is positively related to government
revenues and spending, which may be seen as supportive of the Leviathan hypothesis. They
further ﬁnd that direct democracy is a means to reduce the size of government. For the same
dataset, Feld et al. (2010) ﬁnd, among other things, that government budget will shrink with
more intense interregional tax competition. The decentralisation of revenue power leads to
a reduction of tax revenues, while user charges will increase.
Decentralisation Across Countries
Among the studies focusing on international datasets, Anderson and van den Berg (1998)
examine a worldwide sample of 45 countries, but are unable to establish results in favour
of the Leviathan hypothesis. For panel data on 32 developing and industrial countries from
1980-1994, Jin and Zou (2002) examine how decentralisation aﬀects subnational, national
and consolidated government sector size and ﬁnd evidence in favour of the Leviathan hy-
pothesis, while also accounting for the Oates-Wallis hypothesis. Their results point towards
expenditure decentralisation culminating in a reduction of central government size and an
increase of subnational and aggregate budgets. Greater subnational but reduced national and
compound budgets are found to result from revenue decentralisation. Finally, the existence
of intergovernmental grant schemes raises government budgets at national and subnational
level. Rodden (2003) also stresses the need to speciﬁcally account for whether expenditure
decentralisation is accompanied by tax revenue autonomy. For an international panel dataset
from 1978 through 1999 on 29 countries, the combined decentralisation of expenditures and
revenues points towards a reduction of total government size, while the isolated decentrali-
sation of expenditures will lead to its expansion. For 16 OECD countries, Santolini (2009)
70See Oates (1985).
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examines balanced cross-sectional time series data between 1978 and 1997 testing for the
eﬀect of decentralisation and of the legislature’s monopoly power on government size. The
results imply that ﬁscal decentralisation will constrain Leviathans, while the same holds
for high legislative monopoly power, which runs counter to the Brennan and Buchanan hy-
pothesis. She further tests for the joint eﬀects of decentralisation and legislative control to
conclude that Leviathan can be tamed by austere legislative control, or weak controls of the
legislature in combination with a high degree of sub-national taxation autonomy. Martinez-
Vazquez and Yao (2009) scrutinise the relationship between public sector employment and
decentralisation between 1985 and 2005 for over 100 countries. They ﬁnd that a higher degree
of decentralisation entails higher local level public sector employment, which more than oﬀ-
sets the downsizing of central level public sector employment. To detect how decentralisation
aﬀects government budgets at the national, the subnational and the aggregate level, Cassette
and Paty (2010) examine panel data on the EU-15. They ﬁnd that the resulting increase
in subnational expenditures more than oﬀsets the reduction in central level expenditures,
such that aggregate budgets will be higher with a stronger degree of decentralisation. The
existence of intergovernmental transfers is found to raise the size of government at all levels.
2.3 Summary
Federal taxation is characterised by the co-existence of vertical and horizontal externalities
triggered by one jurisdiction neglecting the impact its own choice of tax rate has on other
jurisdictions at the same or another level. Early theoretical approaches saw federations
as a number of independent regions with a passive federal government. Only horizontal
externalities that distort regional tax policies will then occur.71 In sum, they point towards
a tendency of ineﬃciently low taxation and public good provision. That downward pressure
may be attenuated if regions are not assumed to be symmetric, for example, if they diﬀer in
size, if one region can take advantage of agglomeration rents or is able to diﬀerentiate itself
from competitors via the provided public good.
If a central government acts as an active player, additional vertical tax externalities occur.
While for each region the tax base is elastic, the elasticity of the federal tax base depends,
for instance, on the degree of the country’s openness to international capital markets or the
elasticity of capital supply with respect to the net interest rate prevailing in the federation.
Both levels of government may neglect the impact their decisions have on budgets at the
other level, which may be a consequence of myopic behaviour or diﬀering objective functions.
71These can be divided into indirect positive externalities resulting from the interregional reallocation of
mobile capital tax base and direct negative externalities that may result from a change in the federal net
return on capital.
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These (bottom-up or top-down) vertical externalities point towards tax rates being set higher
than in the centrally planned second-best optimum.
The vertical and horizontal externalities resulting from federal structure thus point in
opposite directions. The relative strength of vertical and horizontal externalities may hinge on
various factors: a high interest rate elasticity of capital supply, a low interest rate elasticity of
capital demand and a strong degree of international capital market integration point towards
a dominance of vertical over horizontal externalities.
To evaluate the eﬃciency of equilibria, the decision-makers’ intentions are of concern: For
benevolent governments, ineﬃcient levels of taxation or public good provision imply a loss of
welfare. For Leviathan governments, dominating vertical externalities, such that consolidated
tax rates are too high, point towards the relevance of the Laﬀer paradoxon. Ineﬃciently low
tax rates may be perceived as welfare enhancing by restraining the Leviathan’s revenue-
maximisation policies.
International capital tax competition adds another layer of externalities: Positive cross-
national horizontal (and vertical) externalities between the federations may attenuate the
vertical externalities within a federation by pointing towards ineﬃciently low tax rates from
a global perspective. By exerting additional downward pressure on tax rates, international
tax competition implies for the vertical externality to be less relevant for the overall level of
tax rates. Or, put diﬀerently, federal structure driving consolidated tax rates upwards within
the federation may function by oﬀsetting the downward pressure on tax rates arising from
international tax competition.
The majority of empirical studies seems to be aﬃrmative of the hypothesis of interre-
gional across- and within-country tax competition implying a complementary relationship
between tax rates. Particularly the more recent studies convey a more diﬀerentiated picture
accounting for the signiﬁcance of regionalism and agglomeration eﬀects within a country as
well as individual regional characteristics that shape the detected strategic interaction. The
evidence is further supportive of the EU integration and enlargement process having (had)
an impact on tax rate choices, while the respective results as to how exactly that strategic in-
teraction can be characterised diﬀer across studies. In any case, the results are aﬃrmative of
the hypothesis that increased international capital market integration intensiﬁes interregional
tax competition.
By including vertical tax interactions, the evidence becomes rather mixed, with a slight
tendency of studies supporting a complementary relationship between upper- and lower-level
tax rates. What is more, given some results on Canadian data,72 it seems likely that a region
may take the role of a Stackelberg leader and that federal as well as same-level jurisdictions’
tax rates react to such leading regions. With respect to the ability of the federal policymakers
72See Hayashi and Boadway (2001) and Crisan (2007).
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to internalise the ineﬃciencies created at the regional level, the evidence is mixed and, if at
all, not in the aﬃrmative.
The evidence on Leviathan government behaviour is far from clear and its existence can
neither be denied nor conﬁrmed. While it is straightforward to test for the Leviathan hy-
pothesis in the context of decentralisation, the testable hypotheses as well as the resulting
implications are diﬃcult to interpret. The existing studies may be seen as indicative of
eﬃciency-raising or -deteriorating eﬀects of decentralisation. It is more likely to raise eﬃ-
ciency if reforms include revenue instead of solely expenditure decentralisation. Whether this
may be attributed to Leviathan behaviour is not necessarily clear. More work thus needs to
be done in order to clarify the speciﬁc channels in which the presence of Leviathan becomes
manifest. In any case, it is fair to say that the assumption of revenue-maximising behaviour
within a model may be justiﬁed to a certain extent and the evaluation of policies needs to
be cautious as to what behaviour one is more inclined to assume.
The fear of the negative impact of globalisation on welfare and tax revenues substantially
shapes ﬁscal policies, as outlined in section 1.1. Indeed, some of the early theoretical contri-
butions on international tax competition support this view of globalised capital markets. The
standard theory developed by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) sees that
policymakers have incentives to reduce tax rates on capital as the latter becomes increasingly
mobile. A zero equilibrium tax rate on mobile capital is even found to result by Bond and
Samuelson (1989) or Razin and Sadka (1991). Notwithstanding that they have been reshaped
and speciﬁed in the succeeding literature,73 these results appear to remain inﬂuential in the
collective conscience. The empirical studies on tax revenue levels cited in section 1.1 further
point towards a more diﬀerentiated view of the consequences of globalisation. The explicit
consideration of federal design (with federal tax setting possibly being driven in a direction
opposite to that predicted by the standard interregional tax competition literature) as well
as the recognition of the contrasting evaluation of results when policymakers are assumed
to be either revenue or welfare maximisers in the context of international tax competition
further enhance the discussion. What is more, theoretical results point towards a diﬀeren-
tiated view of the challenges of globalisation in such that countries do in fact have means
to distinguish themselves from their competitors in various ways, thereby circumventing the
downward pressure on tax rates. The heterogeneity of jurisdictions as well as of citizens’ and
ﬁrms’ preferences entails such possibilities, as was already pointed out by Salmon (2008).
Regarding the worldwide trend towards decentralisation, policy recommendations need
to bear in mind that the empirical evidence suggests for the eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects of
decentralisation to become obsolete if the latter is restricted to expenditure rather than rev-
73See section 2.1.1.
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enue autonomy.74 A global trend towards ﬁscal decentralisation may nonetheless culminate in
growing numbers of countries actually adapting federal tax systems, such that the recognition
of the consequences of tax base overlap becomes even more relevant.
With the arguments brought forward so far, for the evaluation of possible tax policies,
some key questions need to be answered. For one, a more diﬀerentiated view of horizontal
tax competition seems to be in place. Beyond that, the federal framework of the respective
countries is highly relevant. It is further necessary to be aware of whether a country’s policies
are more likely to have been shaped by revenue-maximising rather than welfare-maximising
intentions in the setting of tax rates. The explicit recognition of the competing countries,
particularly their federal design, is also relevant. With respect to the European Union,
policymakers need to be aware of the diﬀerence between the perspective of the European
Union as an economic entity in competition with other states, in contrast to the perspective of
a single member country. With an integrated Europe actually becoming more deeply rooted
in the decision-making process of each member state, this last aspect will be increasingly
important. Finally, worldwide decentralisation trends need to be evaluated cautiously with
respect to expenditure as opposed to revenue decentralisation.
As described in section 1.1, the worldwide trend towards ﬁscal decentralisation combined
with international capital market integration makes the recognition of a country’s federal
framework essential for economic policy design and evaluation. In that respect, research can
still be extended. So far, the theoretical models examining the degree of international capital
tax competition and its impact on tax setting within a federation, have done so either by
assuming that the country ﬁnds itself in one of the boundary cases of perfect integration
or a closed economy or by varying that degree indirectly, for example over the number of
competing states. No approach exists so far that explicitly considers the supply of capital
with regard to a country’s degree of international capital market integration. Furthermore,
not much work has been done with respect to just how the federal structure of a country
inﬂuences its position in the international competition for capital tax base. A few studies
in that respect exist,75 yet there is no systematic discussion of the change in outcomes with
two countries competing for mobile capital with a diﬀering federal setup within one distinct
setting.
The following two chapters aim to ﬁll some of these gaps concerning a country’s federal
framework and its degree of openness with regard to capital mobility and thereby further
validate the key questions outlined in the previous paragraph.
74See section 2.2.4.
75See section 2.1.3.
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Chapter 3
Federal Tax Competition and Capital
Market Integration
This chapter aims to explicitly incorporate a federation’s degree of integration into interna-
tional capital markets to the consideration of eﬃciency of tax rates.
The joint eﬀects of vertical and horizontal tax externalities in the context of capital income
taxation have been studied by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002).1 In their model, the supply
of capital is determined by life-cycle savings. It is demonstrated that whether the horizontal
tax externality dominates the vertical one or vice versa essentially hinges on the elasticity of
savings with respect to the interest rate. If savings are inelastic, the horizontal externality
dominates the vertical one and tax rates of lower level jurisdictions are too low. For elastic
savings, the opposite holds true.
The approach taken in the following chapter is complementary to that of Keen and Kotso-
giannis. Rather than considering life-cycle savings, it relates the supply of capital to the level
of international capital market integration. The key element of the framework established in
this paper is a concept that allows to parameterise the degree of international capital market
integration, which is then incorporated into an eﬃciency-oriented analysis of capital taxation
in a federation. It is shown that if the degree is low, that is, if the economy has only limited
access to the international capital market, the horizontal externality will dominate the verti-
cal one at the state level, whereas the opposite will hold true if the degree is large. This result
implies that in a federal system with limited access to the international capital market there
will be undertaxation of capital income, whereas in a federal system with extensive access
there will be overtaxation by lower level jurisdictions. It is further shown that the eﬃciency
of federal taxation essentially hinges on the assumptions about the strategic behaviour of the
federal government and on the relative behaviour of state and federal taxes. The generated
results establish a link with the results by Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) in such that the
1See section 2.1.2.
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degree of capital market integration works the same way as the interest elasticity of savings.
That is, a high degree of international capital market integration functions by reducing the
relative importance of the horizontal externality as opposed to the vertical externality, given
that capital tax base can be shifted more ﬂexibly abroad. It is further shown that for a spe-
ciﬁc degree of international capital market integration, vertical and horizontal externalities
may oﬀset each other.
The chapter is set up as follows: The next section establishes the analytical framework
and sketches the international interdependencies of capital movements and capital taxation.
Section 3 analyses the possible vertical and horizontal externalities. Attention is ﬁrst paid
to the eﬃciency of state level taxation, followed by an eﬃciency-oriented analysis of federal
level taxation. With the help of a numerical example, section 4 will illustrate the theoretical
results generated in the preceding section. Section 5 concludes.
3.1 The Model
The analytical framework is outlined in the proceeding section. The examined federation is
a small country, whose public sector consists of a federal government and n identical states.
3.1.1 Households
In order to factor out equity considerations, let each state i = 1, . . . , n be populated by a
single representative consumer endowed with one unit of capital. Utility of the consumer in
state i is determined by
u(ci, gi, G) = ci + Γ(gi, G), (3.1)
where ci is private consumption of consumer i, gi is the amount of a local public good provided
in state i and G is federal spending per state. Γ(gi, G) is a felicity function measuring
the utility from local public good provision and federal spending, which satisﬁes the usual
monotonicity and concavity assumptions. An individual’s private consumption is constrained
to
ci = ρ+ (1− θ)πi, (3.2)
in which ρ denotes the net return on capital (which will be seen to be equalised across
states). Each state raises an (exogenous) tax rate θ ∈ [0, 1] on each unit of rental income πi
an individual living in i generates from an immobile factor.
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3.1.2 Production
A constant returns to scale production function is considered, which is identical in all states
and at least twice continuously diﬀerentiable. It displays diminishing returns to scale in its
mobile input factor, capital. Production in state i, denoted as yi, is then determined by
yi = f(ki) = f
′(ki)ki + πi, (3.3)
where ki is the amount of capital employed in state i. Assuming that ﬁrms are proﬁt max-
imisers, f ′(ki)ki is then the income of capital invested in state i.
3.1.3 Capital Mobility
Consumers can choose to invest their capital either in the state in which they live, in some
other state of the federation, or they can invest in the international capital market. While
capital mobility within the federation comes at no cost, it is assumed that international
capital mobility is costly. More precisely, the corresponding cost function is deﬁned as
C
(
σ,
∣∣∣n−∑
i
ki
∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
σ
(
n−
∑
i
ki
)2
, with σ ∈ [0,∞), (3.4)
where
∑
i ki denotes the total capital employed in the federation. The capital available in
the federation is given by n. If n falls short of the total amount of capital employed in the
federation, the country is a net importer of capital.
σ measures the degree of international capital mobility. It may be interpreted as a risk-
premium demanded for international investment projects.2 It is assumed that σ is the same
across countries.3 For σ = 0, the country is a small economy perfectly integrated into the
international capital market. For σ → ∞, the economy is closed and has no access to the
international capital market.
The cost of international capital mobility is depicted by Figure 3.1. The higher the degree
of capital market integration, the lower is a country’s cost of investing abroad. The cost of
international capital mobility increases progressively with the diﬀerence between the total
capital available and the total capital employed in the federation, which can be grasped
intuitively by the assumption that the inherent risk of investing abroad will be the higher,
the more capital is already employed in a country. Assume that the most attractive, or safest,
investment opportunities will be seized ﬁrst. Thus, with a mounting intensity of investment
activity, suppliers of capital may be obliged to resort to other, possibly more risky, projects.
2For the use of a similar term in the context of foreign indebtedness, see van der Ploeg (1996).
3Note that this symmetry assumption may be dropped without further changing the analytical results,
provided that the characteristic cost function is diﬀerentiable at all points. The analysis would, however, be
rendered unnecessarily complicated.
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Figure 3.1: Cost of International Capital Mobility
The possibility of interstate and international investment gives rise to two non-arbitrage
conditions. The interstate non-arbitrage condition is given by
ρ = f ′(ki)− τi ∀i, (3.5)
in which f ′(ki) is the marginal return on capital and τi = ti + T is the aggregate tax burden
imposed on the residents of one state by the local (ti) and the federal (T ) authorities. It
can be inferred from (3.5) that the net return on capital will be the same for interstate
investments, irrespective of what state an individual decides to invest in. Given decreasing
returns to scale, rent-seeking investors will arbitrage away diﬀerences in net return on capital
between states, that is, capital will move between jurisdictions until ρ is equal across all
states.
The cost per additional unit of capital invested outside the federation amounts to σ(n−∑
i ki). The international non-arbitrage condition can then be denoted as
ρ = r + σ
(
1− n∑
i ki
)
∀i, (3.6)
where r is the world market interest rate and n∑
i ki
is the ratio between domestic capital
endowment and capital employment. If the amount of capital employed in the federation is
exceeded by its capital endowment ( n∑
i ki
> 1), that is, if the country is a capital exporter, the
net return on capital prevailing in the federation will fall short of the world market interest
rate. It will only be beneﬁcial to invest abroad as long as the world market interest net the
cost of international investment exceeds the net return on capital generated from domestic
investment.4 In equilibrium,
f ′(ki)− τi = r + σ(1− n∑
i ki
) ∀i.
4It is a valid objection to wonder why in a small country in which the world market interest is exogenous,
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Hence, all possibilities of arbitrage will be extinct and an investor will be indiﬀerent between
investing abroad or at home.
Two benchmark cases of international capital mobility shall now be established, which
will be useful throughout the further analysis.
Lemma 1 Let τi be ﬁnite for all i = 1, . . . , n. Provided that f
′(ki) is a bijective function of
ki, then:
i. ki = (f
′)−1(r + τi), if σ = 0
ii.
∑
i
ki = n, if σ → ∞
Proof:
i. Obvious from (3.5) and (3.6).
ii. The proof is by contradiction. To start with, assume that
∑
i ki ≥ constant > n if
σ → ∞. Then, as τi is ﬁnite and as f ′(ki) − τi = r + σ(1 − n∑
i ki
) for all i, it follows
that f ′(ki) → ∞ for all i. As f ′′ < 0, this necessarily requires ki → 0 for all i, which
contradicts
∑
i ki ≥ constant > n for all i. Now assume that
∑
i ki ≤ constant < n if
σ → ∞. Then, as τi is ﬁnite, it follows that f ′(ki) → −∞, which contradicts f ′ > 0.
Q.E.D.
Figure 3.2 summarises the above discussion. The international net return on capital
is depicted as a linear function increasing in
∑
i ki. Interstate net return on capital is a
decreasing function of ki. Arbitrage-seeking individuals will now have an incentive to invest
inside the federation, as long as the interstate net return on capital exceeds the international
one, and vice versa. Hence, for a given world market interest rate and a speciﬁc tax burden
in every state of the federation, a certain total amount of capital (for example (
∑
i ki)0 < n,
implying that the country is a net exporter of capital) will be employed inside the federation.
Consequently, n− (∑i ki)0 of domestic capital will be employed abroad, which will redound
to a speciﬁc equilibrium net return on capital ρ0.
Now, a tax hike will trigger a drop in the equilibrium net return on capital, yet that
decrease in ρ will be disproportionately small. Assume ﬁrst, for simplicity, that the federal
the individual investor’s choice would inﬂuence the net return on capital. Yet the latter can be solved by
arguing that each individual, when facing the decision where to locate capital, will choose the most attractive
opportunity ﬁrst. For each additional unit of capital provided, a less ‘attractive’ investment opportunity will
be taken up, such that the implicit cost for each investor will in fact vary with each individual’s investment
decision.
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Figure 3.2: Non-Arbitrage Equilibrium
tax is raised, which [via (3.5)] will lead to a simultaneous decrease in the net return on
capital in every state of that federation. As a consequence, investors in the federation will
have an incentive to remove their capital and invest abroad instead. Although that rise
in international investment activity has no impact on r, for each additional unit of capital
located outside the federation, the incurred cost will increase (such that ρ falls). In the same
time, marginal productivity of capital inside the federation will again approach the initial
level and domestic investment will again pick up. In conclusion, the arbitrage opportunities
arising due to the federal tax hike will lead to a new equilibrium in which a larger share
of total domestic capital is employed internationally and the net return on capital settles
at a lower level than before. Note that if a single state decides to raise its tax, not only
will international investment become more attractive, investors will also have an incentive to
relocate their capital into the other states of the federation. In both cases, the drop in net
return on capital will be disproportionately small in comparison to the change in tax burden.
Figure 3.3 displays the benchmark cases of σ = 0 and σ → ∞ graphically. In the ﬁrst case,
an individual will incur no cost of relocating investments between countries. The amount
employed inside the federation will then be such that the equilibrium net return on capital
equals the world market interest. In the latter case, all domestic capital is employed inside
the federation and no capital will enter the country, such that
∑
i ki = n, irrespective of
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Figure 3.3: Non-Arbitrage Equilibrium - Benchmark Cases
national tax policies or capital productivity.
3.1.4 Policy Implications
As outlined in the previous section, the net return on capital is inﬂuenced by the tax regime
in the federation. Furthermore, the rental income an individual generates also depends on
the aggregate tax burden in each state.
Equation (3.5) implicitly deﬁnes ki as a function ki = ki(ρ+ τi), with k
′
i(ρ+ τi) =
1
f ′′i
,5 in
which f ′′i := f
′′(ki). Then, equation (3.6) implicitly deﬁnes ρ as a function ρ = ρ(τ1, . . . , τn)
and (applying the implicit function theorem)
∂ρ
∂τi
=
σ
n
(
∑
i ki)
2
1
f ′′i
1− σ n
(
∑
i ki)
2
∑
i
1
f ′′i
,
and for τ1 = τ2 = ... = τn = τ
∂ρ
∂τ
=
σ
nk2f ′′ − nσ ≤ 0, (3.7)
5Provided again that f ′(ki) be a bijective function of ki.
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with ∂ρ
∂τ
= 0, as σ = 0, and ∂ρ
∂τ
→ − 1
n
, as σ → ∞.
Let each individual receive a rental income πi from the possession of a ﬁxed factor deﬁned
by
πi = f(ki)− f ′(ki)ki,
which then denotes the amount by which the capital product exceeds its remuneration. In
it, ki = ki(ρ+ τi), which implies that πi = πi(ρ+ τi), with π
′
i = −ki. Thus,
∂πi
∂τi
= −ki( ∂ρ
∂τi
+ 1).
Hence, the change in rental income due to a shift in τi is given by the eﬀect of that shift
on ki and by the impact of the tax-induced change in ρ on ki.
3.1.5 Government Objectives
A two-levelled federation is considered, in which the federal government is complemented by
state-level governments. Both are assumed to be benevolent.
The n states compete for mobile tax base, therein engaging in Nash competition. The
benevolent state tries to maximise the welfare of its constituents, irrespective of the possible
impact its actions may have on citizens of other states. Consequently, each state i maximises
ui = ρ+ (1− θ)πi + Γ(gi, G),
subject to
gi = tiki + θπi
and
G =
1
n
T
∑
i
ki
by choice of ti and the resulting level of gi. Each state government derives its revenue from the
taxation of capital (ki) and rents (πi). It redistributes that revenue among its constituents
by means of the supply of the state public good.
The benevolent and omniscient federal government maximises welfare of all consumers in
all states i = 1, . . . , n across its jurisdiction subject to the respective budget constraints by
choice of G and the corresponding level of T. It derives revenue from the taxation of the total
amount of capital employed in the federation and redistributes tax revenues evenly across all
states.
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3.2 Horizontal and Vertical Externalities
The model gives rise to vertical as well as horizontal externalities. With each local government
neglecting the impact its tax decisions have on the budget of the other local entities, it triggers
a horizontal externality. A vertical externality arises from perfect tax base overlap. With an
omniscient federal government, only a bottom-up vertical externality will occur, given that
each state underestimates the loss of tax revenue the federal government incurs due to a rise
in taxation at the state level.
The analysis is carried out as follows: First, the state level is considered. It is examined
whether under the outlined structure, states will excessively tax capital. Proceeding to the
federal level, the same question is asked, allowing for the federal government to either engage
in Nash competition or act as a Stackelberg leader. Throughout the analysis, reference is
made to the benchmark cases outlined in Lemma 1.
3.2.1 Are State Taxes Too High or Too Low?
Each lower level government intends to maximise its inhabitant’s utility by choice of its
tax rate. Assuming that states engage in Nash competition, the resulting equilibrium is
characterised by each state i setting the optimal tax given the decision of all other states.
Equilibrium is then deﬁned by symmetric strategies, so that from the maximisation problem
as outlined in section 2.5., each state’s ﬁrst-order condition is given by:
∂u
∂t
=
∂ρ
∂τ
+
(
1− θ
)
π′
(∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
+ Γg
[
k +
(
tk′ + θπ′
)(∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)]
+ ΓG
1
n
Tk′
(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
= 0.
(3.8)
From (3.8), it can be inferred that the change in utility of a representative consumer due
to a rise in capital taxation in one state depends on the responsiveness of net return on capital
to a shift in capital taxation ( ∂ρ
∂τ
). As shown in (3.7), the latter is negative (or zero) and will
be the closer to zero, the more integrated into the international capital market a country is.
A state government accounting for this eﬀect for its constituents tends to neglect that the
citizens of every other jurisdiction will be subject to the same drop in ρ, which points to state
taxes being too high. On the other hand, capital will be relocated for a given tax hike, such
that the other jurisdictions’ tax base will rise, which each regional decision-maker does not
account for. That positive horizontal externality points towards state taxes being too low.
Equation (3.8) is further inﬂuenced by the drop in after-tax rental income of a representative
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consumer due to a capital tax increase [(1− θ)π′( ∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1)], which is in turn a function of the
amount of capital employed in the state.
ΓG and Γg denote the marginal valuation of federal and state spending respectively. Di-
minishing marginal utility leads to them being the smaller, the higher the prevailing level
of the respective public good supply. In the case of state public good provision (depicted
by the ﬁrst term in squared brackets), the state government bears in mind the increase in
utility as a consequence of a higher level of public good provision due to the additional rev-
enues from the higher tax rate as opposed to the loss of tax base as a consequence of the
arbitrage-seeking behaviour of individuals. That is, it accounts for the resulting tax income
as opposed to the tax base eﬀect upon evaluating the change in utility derived from regional
public good provision. The tax base reduction will be the greater, the higher the rise in state
tax, while it is in the same time (less than fully) oﬀset by the resulting overall drop in net
return on capital. The utility derived from federal public good supply is aﬀected in such
that the federal tax base, which is equivalent to the sum of all states’ capital tax base, will
diminish due to the state tax hike by capital not only shifting within the federation, but also
relocating abroad. The federal tax base will thus decrease, which, in turn, reduces federal
expenditures. Each state only accounts for the negative impact of the resulting reduction in
federal expenditures with regard to the welfare of its own citizens, which depicts the vertical
externality triggered by state policies pointing towards ineﬃciently high regional tax rates.
Since the federal government equally divides its expenditures between the states, only 1
n
th
of the federal tax base reduction is incorporated by each state.
That is, an increase in capital taxation in one of the states will trigger several eﬀects.
The state government anticipates the impact the higher tax burden has on its citizens’ rental
income and utility derived from state public good supply. Meanwhile, it neglects the potential
eﬀects in other states, thereby triggering a horizontal externality, which points to ineﬃciently
low taxation. In the same time, the optimising state government does not fully account for
the drop in federal public good supply caused by the decrease in federal tax base, such that
taxation tends to be ineﬃciently high, as depicted by the second term in (3.8). To understand
whether Nash competition among the states leads to ineﬃcient equilibrium taxation, it is
considered how a coordinated tax hike by all states aﬀects welfare within the federation.
Starting from the described symmetric Nash equilibrium, taxes are simultaneously increased
in all states to have
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∂u
n∂t
= n
∂ρ
∂τ
+
(
1− θ
)
π′
(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
+ Γg
[
k +
(
tk′ + θπ′
)(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)]
+ ΓGTk
′
(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
.
(3.9)
The sign of (3.9) is now of interest. If it is zero, it indicates that state taxation is in fact
eﬃcient. If it is positive, the horizontal externality is likely to be dominant, whereas (3.9)
being less than zero points towards a dominant vertical externality. Subtract (3.8) from (3.9)
to have
du
dt
=
∂u
n∂t
− ∂u
∂t
=
horizontal externality︷ ︸︸ ︷[
1 +
(
1− θ)π′ + Γg(tk′ + θπ′)](n− 1)∂ρ
∂τ
+ΓGTk
′(n− 1)(∂ρ
∂τ
+
1
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
vertical externality
.
(3.10)
With the horizontal externality pointing towards state taxes being too low and the vertical
externality pointing towards state taxes being too high, the sign of (3.10) is ambiguous. In
order to gain some further insight, the two benchmark cases established in Lemma 1 will
again be referred to. Assume ﬁrst for σ to be zero. As a consequence, (3.7) will be zero, so
that (3.10) becomes
du
dt
= ΓGTk
′n− 1
n
< 0,
implying that for a given tax hike, the utility of the representative consumer will fall. Hence,
in the case of perfect integration into the international capital market, the vertical externality
dominates the horizontal externality.
This result can be easily grasped intuitively: If capital is perfectly mobile, non-arbitrage
leads to an increase in state taxes having no impact on rental income of the constituents
in the entire federation. Given that the cost of international capital mobility is equal to
zero, the reduction in net return on capital due to an increased tax burden can be simply
oﬀset by relocating capital abroad, thereby generating returns at the exogenous rate r. The
withdrawal of capital will in the meantime increase capital productivity in the states up to a
point at which the net return on capital settles again where it is equal to the world market
interest. That is, if capital is perfectly mobile, ρ will equal the world market interest r in
all states of the federation. Thus, the tax policy in state i has no impact on the net return
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on capital and, subsequently, no impact on tax revenue of state j. As a consequence, the
horizontal externality will vanish and the vertical externality triggered by capital relocating
abroad remains. This dominant bottom-up vertical externality is why the state tax level is
ineﬃciently high in the case of perfect capital market integration. It will be the stronger, the
greater k′, that is, the greater the tax base reduction due to the increase in capital taxation.
The second case is that of a closed economy, in which capital supply equals capital de-
mand, which implies that all the eﬀects of a tax hike will be fully incurred within the fed-
eration. Hence, σ → ∞, which implies that ∂ρ
∂τ
→ − 1
n
and k = 1. It then follows that (3.9)
will be equal to ∂u
n∂t
= −1 + Γg, where Γg is the elasticity of consumer utility with respect to
regional spending. The horizontal externality will then dominate if Γg > 1. So when is this
the case?
It follows from (3.8) that
Γg =
1 + (1− θ)(n− 1)
n+ (
t
f ′′
− θ)(n− 1)
.
Therefore, provided that n + ( t
f ′′ − θ)(n − 1) > 0, it follows that Γg > 1 if and only if
1 + (1− θ)(n− 1) > n+ ( t
f ′′ − θ)(n− 1). From this inequality it can be inferred that Γg > 1
if t > 0, such that, consequently, ∂u
n∂t
= −1 + Γg > 0. Hence, the horizontal externality will
dominate if the country is isolated from the international capital market and if t > 0. The
intuition behind this is straightforward: Given that σ → ∞ implies that the economy is
closed, the federal tax base becomes independent of the taxes raised by the states, such that
the vertical externality will approach zero. With respect to the tax burden, it can be inferred
that t will be positive if the tax rate on rental income is suﬃciently small. This aspect can
be easily grasped by the fact that if rental income is not taxed at all, state governments must
raise a tax on capital in order for suﬃcient income to be generated for the provision of public
goods. Under the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of public good provision, the
utility derived from the ﬁrst supplied unit will approach inﬁnity, such that states will always
have an incentive to provide at least a certain amount of public goods.
Now, as the preceding discussion showed, for σ = 0, the vertical externality dominates the
horizontal externality, and for σ → ∞, the horizontal externality dominates the vertical one.
Hence, assuming that σ is continuous, there must exist some optimal degree of integration
into the international capital market, such that both externalities oﬀset each other. It can
be concluded:
Proposition 1 Consider a Nash equilibrium with symmetric strategies of the states. Then:
i. The vertical externality will dominate the horizontal externality (there will be overtax-
ation at the state level) if the federation is strongly integrated into the international
capital market (σ small).
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ii. The horizontal externality will dominate the vertical externality (there will be undertax-
ation at the state level) if σ is large and if state taxes satisfy t > 0.
iii. There is some σˆ ∈ [0,∞), such that both externalities will oﬀset each other, if σ = σˆ.
Remark: t > 0 if θ is small.
With reference to Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), who ﬁnd that the horizontal externality
will dominate the vertical externality at the state level if rental income is fully taxed and
t > 0, it can be further examined how the discussion will change if the states fully tax rental
income in this setting. Substracting n times (3.8) from (3.9) and setting θ = 1 yields
∂u
n∂t
− n∂u
∂t
= (1− n)Γgtk′ > 0, (3.11)
which will obviously be the case only if t > 0. Hence, the same result is generated as in Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2002), that for fully taxed rents the horizontal externality will dominate
the vertical externality at the state level if revenue generated from rental income taxation is
not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the provision of a public good.
Proposition 2 Let states fully tax rental income (θ = 1). Then:
i. The horizontal externality dominates the vertical externality if t > 0.
3.2.2 Are Federal Taxes Too High or Too Low?
Similar to the state governments, the federal government intends to maximise the welfare of
all individuals within its jurisdiction. If it decides to increase taxes, this will have a direct
impact on aggregate taxation in every state, which will in turn each aﬀect the utility of
any individual within the federation. Thus, given state taxation as set in a Nash game, the
federal government’s ﬁrst order condition is depicted by
∂u
∂T
= n
∂ρ
∂τ
+
(
1− θ
)
π′
(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
+ Γg
(
tk′ + θπ′
)(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)
+ ΓG
[
k + Tk′
(
n
∂ρ
∂τ
+ 1
)]
= 0.
(3.12)
Just as before, horizontal and vertical eﬀects point in opposite directions. With state-level
taxation as established in the preceding section, two cases can now be distinguished with
respect to the assumed strategic behaviour of the federal government.
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In the ﬁrst case, the federal government plays Nash. It will then maximise the utility of
each individual by choosing its best-response T, taking the equilibrium state taxes as given.
That is, given the shortcomings of state tax-setting, the federal government will impose an
optimal capital tax rate.
The second case is characterised by the assumption that the federal government has a
ﬁrst-mover advantage. State and federal governments will then engage in a sequential game,
with the latter choosing an optimal T, allowing for the states to subsequently set their taxes
in a Nash game while taking T as given. The federal decision-makers must then choose T
with respect to t = t(T ), which is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order-conditions of the states.
They will thus maximise the utility u = u[T, t(T )] of a representative individual by setting
du
dT
=
∂u
∂t
t′(T ) +
∂u
∂T
= 0. (3.13)
In (3.13), the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side denotes the change in utility an individual in-
curs due to a shift in optimal-response state taxes triggered by a variation in federal taxation.
The second term denotes the direct change in utility due to a federal tax hike as depicted by
(3.12). Aiming for (3.13) to be fulﬁlled, the decision-makers might deem it optimal to set a
tax by deviating from the optimality condition given by (3.12). The question is then, whether
the federal government has an incentive to deviate from its optimal tax rate as deﬁned in
(3.12) by choosing a higher or lower level of taxation. In fact, federal tax rates will be chosen
lower than in the Nash equilibrium, such that ∂u
∂T
> 0 in order for (3.13) to be fulﬁlled, if
∂u
∂t
t′(T ) < 0, and vice versa. In other words: If states engage in Nash competition and the
federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader, it can be inferred that there is overtaxation
(undertaxation) at the federal level if ∂u
∂t
and t′(T ) are of opposite (equal) signs. More pre-
cisely, if federal and state taxes are strategic substitutes [t′(T ) < 0], then federal taxes will
be set lower (higher) than in the Nash equilibrium if state taxes are too low (too high). The
reverse is the case if state and federal taxes are strategic complements.6 These results can
be easily grasped intuitively: Assuming that state taxes are too low, the optimising federal
government will aim to oﬀset the state-induced ineﬃciencies by choosing a higher (lower)
federal tax than in the Nash equilibrium if state and federal taxes are strategic complements
(substitutes) with the goal to provide an incentive for states to subsequently set their tax
rates such that the consolidated tax burden will be eﬃcient.
Propositions 3 and 4 summarise the discussion:
Proposition 3 Let federal and state taxes be strategic substitutes [ie. t′(T ) < 0]. Then, in
a Stackelberg equilibrium with symmetric strategies of the states:
6Note for the sake of completeness that federal taxation will be chosen eﬃciently as in the Nash equilibrium
if state taxes are eﬃcient (∂u∂t = 0).
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i. Federal taxes are higher than in a Nash equilibrium, if the vertical externality dominates
the horizontal externality at the state level (state taxes being too high).
ii. Federal taxes are lower than in a Nash equilibrium, if the horizontal externality domi-
nates the vertical externality at the state level (state taxes being too low).
Proposition 4 Let federal and state taxes be strategic complements [ie. t′(T ) > 0]. Then,
in a Stackelberg equilibrium with symmetric strategies of the states (ie. ti = t for all i):
i. Federal taxes are higher than in a Nash equilibrium, if state taxes are too low (the
horizontal externality dominates the vertical externality).
ii. Federal taxes are lower than in a Nash equilibrium, if state taxes ti are too high (the
vertical externality dominates the horizontal externality).
3.2.3 Numerical Example
The results generated in the previous sections are now illustrated with the help of a numerical
example. Let
i. f(k) = kα,
such that f ′ = αkα−1 and f ′′ = α(α− 1)kα−2
ii. π = (1− α)kα
iii.
∂ρ
∂τ
=
σ
nα(α− 1)kα−1 − nσ
iv. Γ(g,G) = β(lng + lnG)
such that Γg =
β
g
and ΓG =
β
G
.
Let further α = 0.25, β = 0.1, n = 10, r = 0.125.
Simulation of a symmetric Nash equilibrium yields the numerical results as depicted in
Table 1.7 The simulation distinguishes three cases with respect to capital market integration,
that is, the two benchmark cases of perfect integration (σ = 0) and an isolated country (with
σ = 109), as well as the case of ‘optimal’ capital market integration, in which the proposed
value for σ is realised for which the externalities oﬀset each other.
7Note that in Table 1 an asterisk denotes the best response in Nash competition, while the superscript
‘opt’ denotes the optimal values the parameters should take for an eﬃcient solution to be reached.
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σ k∗ t∗ T ∗ kopt topt T opt
0 1.176 0.054 0.042 1.352 0.037 0.037
0.02 = σˆ 0.980 0.066 0.066 0.980 0.066 0.066
109 1.000 0.068 0.100 1.000 0.100 0.100
Table 3.1: Nash Simulation
Table 1 shows that k = 1 for a high value of σ. That is, if the economy is closed, all capital
will be employed inside the federation. In comparison to the optimal values, state taxes will
be too low. By contrast, if the country is perfectly integrated into the international capital
market (σ = 0), the country is a net importer of capital and state taxes will be excessively
high. In both cases, the federal government is assumed to play Nash and set its tax optimal
given state taxation. If σ takes its optimal value, the federation is a net exporter of capital
and the realised taxes coincide with their optimal values.
If the federal government acts as a Stackelberg leader, the simulation will yield the results
as displayed in Table 2, distinguishing the same three cases for σ as above.8
σ t∗ T ∗ T s(sub) T s(com) topt T opt
0 0.054 0.042 0.052 0.037 0.037 0.037
0.02=σˆ 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.066
30 0.067 0.094 0.068 0.095 0.094 0.094
Table 3.2: Stackelberg Simulation
States are assumed to play Nash by setting t∗. Further, T ∗ depicts the choice of tax
rate for the federal government in a Nash game. If the federal government has a ﬁrst-mover
advantage and state and federal taxes act as strategic substitutes, the realised federal tax
will fall short of its optimal value T ∗, if states are excessively low, and vice versa. On the
contrary, in the case of strategic complementarity, federal taxation will be (slightly) too high,
if state taxes are excessively low, and vice versa.
The results correspond with what the theoretical model suggested. That is, the likely
eﬀects of ﬁscal externalities are largely dependent on the assumptions about the strategic
behaviour of state and federal governments as well as on the assumptions about the relative
behaviour of federal and state taxes. The degree of international capital market integration
8Note that in Table 2 the superscript ‘S’ refers to the solution for the federal government acting as a
Stackelberg leader. The extension ‘(sub)’ refers to the case of strategic substitutability of state and federal
taxes, while the extension ‘(com)’ denotes that federal and state taxes are strategic complements. For
reference, the optimal and the Nash solutions are given as well.
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functions by curbing the extent to which a change in τ causes a vertical or a horizontal
externality respectively.
3.3 Summary
The previous discussion showed that the ineﬃciencies of taxation in a federal system are
potentially related to the extent to which a country is integrated into the international
ﬁnancial market. It was shown that a strong degree of integration will lead to the vertical
externality dominating the horizontal one at the state level. State taxes will thus be too
high. The horizontal externality will, on the other hand, dominate at the state level, if the
economy has only limited access to the international capital market. That is, a high degree of
integration into international capital markets functions by reducing the relative impact of the
horizontal externality in such that the net return on capital is determined more directly by
the exogenous world market interest. At the same time, the vertical externality will become
increasingly important by tax base being shifted more ﬂexibly abroad, thereby reducing the
federal tax base. By endogenising the degree of capital market integration it was shown that
there exists a speciﬁc value for which both externalities oﬀset each other. Hence, a policy
balance with respect to the openness of an economy may in fact incur an overall eﬃcient level
of taxation. Given that the model is a variation of Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), the results
demonstrate that the recognition of the degree of international capital market integration
functions the same as the interest rate elasticity of savings.
The results can be further speciﬁed with respect to the assumptions about the strategic
behaviour of the federal government. That is, given the above results, a Nash federal gov-
ernment will choose tax rates eﬃciently given state taxation. If the federal government has
a ﬁrst-mover advantage, the result hinges on the eﬃciency of state taxes as well as on the
characterisation of federal and state taxes as strategic substitutes or complements. In the
former case, an ineﬃciently low state capital tax implies that federal taxation will be lower
than in the Nash equilibrium, and vice versa. In the latter case, federal taxes will be higher
than in the Nash equilibrium if the rate at which the states tax capital is ineﬃciently low.
The applied model yields a concise depiction of the impact of international capital market
integration on optimal taxation strategies of state and federal governments. Obviously, the
analysed structure is subject to some limitations, especially given the simpliﬁed model world
economy considered.
For one, the model does not allow for any heterogeneity among the citizens. The consider-
ation is limited to a single representative consumer, which allows for eﬃciency considerations
only. The federal government does not diﬀerentiate with respect to indigence or structural
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diﬀerences. Yet, heterogeneity in preferences and needs within a state or a federation9 may
distort the results in such that the federal government distributing its wealth evenly across
the states may itself create ineﬃciencies. Not allowing for heterogeneity in fact enables for
some simplifying assumptions made in the model. The same holds for the recognition of
heterogeneity across states. What is more, by dropping the assumption of symmetric cost
functions, an analysis of the interaction of high and low risk regions could be a topic for
further model speciﬁcation.
An assumption in the discussion of federal taxation is the prevalence of complete and
perfect information of all players. The extension of the model to decisions under uncertainty
might yield meaningful results. Moreover, how would the situation change if the states did
not simply take the federal decision as given, but had a chance to react to the tax set by
the federal government? The overall structure of the tax system is kept fairly concise. More
complex tax instruments, such as the possibility of tax deductibility or earned income tax
credits, which could be of some relevance to the real world, are not considered.
While possible interactions of the diﬀerent federal levels are incorporated into the model,
the latter is restricted to a single-economy analysis. No attention is paid to possible policy
changes abroad triggered by a change in capital taxation at home. An extension to the model
could stem from the analysis of a two- or multiple-economy world, into which the strategic
interaction between countries is incorporated. The federal government itself could thus react
to tax competition with other countries, thereby triggering another horizontal externality. It
is this last set of objectives which the subsequent chapter is going to address.
9As modeled by Rizzo (2005), for example.
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Chapter 4
Tax Competition and Federal Design
A multitude of papers exists assessing the eﬀects of horizontal competition in terms of several
unitary states engaging in competition with each other. Papers assessing federal taxation
have mainly focused on the interrelation of vertical and horizontal externalities within one
country, while only a few approaches characterise the interaction of two federal states or a
federal and a unitary state.1 What appears to be missing is an integrated approach that
systematically compares within one distinct setting, how a change in the institutional design
of two countries competing for mobile tax base inﬂuences tax rate choices. The intention
is to thereby give a systematic overview of the occuring changes that are not aﬀected by
diﬀerences in the model speciﬁcations.
In that respect, the approach pursued in this chapter is the following: Instead of adding
another layer to the existing models of federal taxation, it gives an overview of how tax
rates set by two countries competing for mobile capital will change with diﬀerent federal
structures. The aim is to strip the applied model of all unnecessary complexity, in order to
keep it as simple as possible and to add clarity to the results. A sequential-move game with
revenue-maximising Leviathan governments2 is examined, which, to the best of knowledge,
has not been treated in the existing literature. A baseline scenario of two unitary states
competing over mobile capital is ﬁrst considered, where, obviously, only horizontal eﬀects
occur. The model is then extended to a second scenario in which one country is unitary
and another is a federation. In a third step, the analysis is carried out for the case of two
federations interacting in the very same setting as before. The aim is to verify the classic
1These approaches each diﬀer in their model speciﬁcations, such as the assumptions with regard to the
extent to which each jurisdictional level sees through the intentions of its competitors. See section 2.1.3 for
more detail.
2The consideration of a Leviathan-government as opposed to a welfare-maximising decision-maker is,
of course, subject to discussion. See section 2.2.4 for further detail. From a theoretical point of view, the
Leviathan approach yields a relatively easy to handle model with fairly clear-cut results, which makes it quite
attractive, particularly with regard to the multiple-layer interactions depicted by two competing federations.
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result of Leviathan governments being restrained by tax competition with other countries and
to describe the respective externalities at work in each setting and the eﬃciency of chosen tax
rates.3 The impact of a tax hike in one jurisdiction on revenues in other jurisdictions is taken
into consideration as well as that of coordinated tax hikes on individual and consolidated
revenues.
The relevance of this study becomes apparent by considering the European Union, as
discussed in the introduction. With free capital mobility between member states, it is a
relevant question whether it will make a diﬀerence for a country such as Germany to be
competing in tax rates with another federal country or a unitary country such as France.
From a diﬀerent perspective, with respect to a possible further enlargement, it might be a
diﬀerent thing for Germany or France when new member states join the European Union
with an institutional structure that is unitary or federal. What is more, the political reality
frequently sees member states acting as independent entities aiming to maximise their own
revenue, while neglecting to a large degree the eﬀect their own choices have on other member
states. That is, another relevant question to ask with respect to the European Union is
whether EU-wide budgets would proﬁt from further integration and coordination between
member states, and what role intensiﬁed capital tax competition plays in that context.
This chapter is setup as follows: The next section gives a general overview of the model,
while sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 deal with the analysis of the three cases outlined above, that
is, two unitary countries (4.2), a unitary and a federal country (4.3) and two federal countries
(4.4) competing over capital tax base. Section 6 concludes by summarising and discussing
the results and possible policy implications.
4.1 The Model
A very brief overview of the basic model will now be given, which will be further speciﬁed
in each of the following sections. The analytical framework is set up by two countries A
and B competing for mobile capital with each other. Country A (B) is inhabited by n (m)
individuals, who are immobile and each endowed with one unit of perfectly mobile capital.4
Individuals choose to invest either in country A or country B, while no cost is faced for
3The eﬃciency of tax rates, that is, in such that from the perspective of a Leviathan government, a tax
will be optimal if it maximises revenues. Obviously, it will be ineﬃciently high, if revenues rise by a drop in
the respective tax rate, or too low in the reverse case. See section 2.2.4 for further detail.
4These two assumptions apply to the case of the European Union, where capital moves freely between
member states. The mobility of citizens is - by law - also granted (except for the recently joined member
states, where labour market protectionism led to the mobility of the labour force being somewhat limited,
at least until 2014 [see European Union (2009)], yet given language and (to some extent) cultural barriers,
labour mobility is signiﬁcantly less pronounced, which corresponds with the assumptions of the model.
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international investment.
The capital available in each jurisdiction is used for production, where a constant re-
turns to scale production function is considered, which is identical in all jurisdictions and at
least twice continuously diﬀerentiable. It displays diminishing returns to scale in its mobile
input factor, capital. Per-capita production in country C = A,B, denoted as yiC , is then
determined by
yiC = f(kiC) = f
′(kiC)kiC + πiC ,
where kiC is the per-capita amount of capital employed in country C. Assuming that ﬁrms
are proﬁt maximisers, f ′(kiC)kiC is then the capital income per head in country C. πiC
denotes the rental income accruing to each consumer i living in C from an immobile factor.
Hence, in country C
πiC = f(kiC)− f ′(kiC)kiC ,
from which follows that
π′iC = −kiC . (4.1)
Each individual derives utility from consumption ﬁnanced by individual rental income
πi taxed at the exogenous rate θ
5 and the return on capital investments, which is taxed
at a speciﬁc rate by each jurisdiction. Hence, they aim to maximise the net return on
capital investments ρ = f ′(kiC) − τiC , where f ′(kiC) is the marginal product of per-capita
capital invested in each country C and τiC is the total tax burden imposed on capital in each
jurisdiction, which will all be further speciﬁed in the proceeding sections. It follows that the
amount of investments in each country is a function of the net return on capital and the
capital tax rate each jurisdiction chooses. That is, kiC = kiC(ρ + τiC), such that, applying
the implicit function theorem,
k′iC =
1
f ′′(kiC)
< 0.
4.2 Two Unitary Countries
The case of two unitary countries A and B6 competing for capital will ﬁrst be considered. The
setup is solved by backward induction as a two-stage game in which both governments act
5θ may be divided into a regional (δ) and a federal (Δ) share, such that θ = δ +Δ in a federation.
6Here, obviously, n = 0.
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as Nash players simultaneously choosing their tax rate taking that of the other jurisdiction
as given, while the individuals subsequently make their investment decisions. Each of the
following subsections characterises one particular stage of the game. Production is deﬁned
as in section 4.1.
4.2.1 Capital Investment
Each individual has the option of investing capital at home or abroad, facing a net return
given by
ρ = f ′(KC)− TC ,
in which f ′(KC) denotes the marginal product of capital invested and TC is the corresponding
tax rate levied within the jurisdiction of country A or B respectively. Given perfect capital
mobility, non-arbitrage will lead to the net return on investment being equal across both
countries, such that
ρ = f ′(KA)− TA = f ′(KB)− TB
implying that ρ = ρ(TA;TB). Total capital supply is given by
n+m = KA(ρ+ TA) +KB(ρ+ TB)
with ρ = ρ(TA;TB), from which follows that:
∂ρ
∂TA
= −
∂KA
∂TA
∂KA
∂ρ
+ ∂KB
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂TB
= −
∂KB
∂TB
∂KA
∂ρ
+ ∂KB
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0).
That is, the net return on capital in one jurisdiction will fall for a corresponding tax hike.
It will fall less than one-to-one (except if capital supply is ﬁxed), given that the reduction in
capital investment due to the lower net return will be accompanied by a higher productivity
of capital investments, just as described in section 3.1.3.
62
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
4.2.2 Government Objectives
For country A, the objective can be described the following way:
max
TA
RA = TAKA(ρ+ TA) + θπA(ρ+ TA),
that is, it aims to maximise revenues RA generated from the taxation of capital and rental
income by choice of the tax levied on capital within its jurisdiction. Each government plays
Nash, that is, upon choosing its tax rate, it takes the other country’s tax as given. Bearing
in mind that ρ = ρ(TA;TB) the ﬁrst-order condition of country A’s government is described
by
∂RA
∂TA
= KA(ρ+ TA) + TAK
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ 1) + θΠ′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ 1) = 0. (4.2)
That is, A will take into account that its tax rate choice will have a direct tax income eﬀect,
as depicted by the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (4.2). The second and the third
term imply that the government will also incur a change in tax base. For one, capital tax
base will be reduced by investors withdrawing capital and investing elsewhere instead as a
consequence of the higher tax burden. On the other hand, the resulting shift in overall net
return on capital (due to higher tax rates and the resulting reduction in capital productivity
in the other region triggered by the relocation of investment) will again attenuate the capital
tax base eﬀect. The same applies to the reduction in rental income. Yet, each government
accounts for these eﬀects only insofar as its own tax base is concerned, while not taking
into account that it triggers a positive horizontal externality aﬀecting the tax base by the
neighbouring country. For simplicity, using (4.1), equation (4.2) can be rewritten as
∂RA
∂TA
= KA(ρ+ TA) + (TAK
′
A − θKA)(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ 1)] = 0, (4.3)
where the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the tax revenue eﬀect and the second term is
the tax base eﬀect. Given that country A’s optimal choice of tax rates implicitly depends on
the tax rate chosen by the other country’s government (and the same reasoning holds for the
government in country B), equilibrium is characterised by TA = TA(TB) and TB = TB(TA),
such that ρ = ρ(TA(TB);TB(TA)). In order to determine whether from the perspective of the
Leviathan government tax rates thus chosen will be too high or too low in equilibrium, a
coordinated tax hike of both countries is considered, whose eﬀect on A’s revenues is given by
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
= KA(ρ+ TA) + (TAK
′
A − θKA)(
∂ρ
∂TA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
+ 1)]. (4.4)
63
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
To gain insight on the sign of (4.4), equation (4.3), which is zero, is substracted from (4.4)
to have
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
− ∂RA
∂TA
= (TAK
′
A − θKA)(
∂ρ
∂TB
) > 0. (4.5)
The analogous expression holds for country B. That is, revenues could be increased by a
coordinated tax hike in both countries, given that governments do not take into account
the horizontal eﬀects triggered by their choice of tax rates. That corresponds with the
classic result that horizontal competition restrains Leviathan governments in their revenue-
maximising intentions.
4.3 Unitary and Federal Country
With the interaction of a unitary and a federal country the situation becomes slightly more
complex. Country A is divided into n regions each inhabited by a single consumer endowed
with one unit of capital. Country B is unitary and inhabited by m individuals possessing
one unit of capital each.7 Inhabitants are assumed to be evenly distributed across their
home jurisdiction. The situation is analysed by backward induction in a three-stage game.
First, the governments at the federal level set their tax rates. They act as a Stackelberg
leader towards the regional governments while engaging in Nash competition with each other.
Subsequently, the regional governments in country A choose their tax rates as Nash players,
bearing in mind the tax rates set by the federal governments. Finally, the individuals decide
where to invest the capital available to them.
4.3.1 Capital Investment
Individuals derive utility from consumption, which is ﬁnanced by the net return on investment
plus the after-tax rental income. The utility maximising individual living in country A then
has the choice of investing at home, in any other region of the federation or abroad (in country
B, that is). Likewise, each inhabitant of country B chooses to invest inside his home country
or abroad, in any of A’s regions. Hence, total capital supply in one region of country A is
given by
kAi = kAiNAT + k
∗
iB,
7To be precise: For symmetry reasons, B is assumed to be divided into m regions each inhabited by one
individual, yet the taxation of capital is centralised, such that one uniform national tax rate is levied.
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where i = 1, . . . , n stands for each region in country A, kAiNAT denotes the amount of capital
available in A that is actually invested in region i, k∗iB depicts the amount of capital available
in B that is invested in region i of country A.
Total capital supply in any of B’s regions8 is given by
kB = kBNAT + k
∗
A,
where kBNAT denotes the amount of capital available in B that is actually invested in country
B per region, k∗A depicts the amount of capital available in A that is invested in each region
of country B. Total investments in B can be described by KB = nkB.
All capital invested inside region i of country A will be subject to the consolidated tax
rate τAi = tAi+TA, where the former denotes the tax levied by region i and the latter denotes
the tax levied by the federal government in country A.9 All capital invested inside country
B will be taxed at rate TB. Hence, the investment decisions for one individual living in A or
B respectively can be described the following way:
ρANAT = f
′(kAi)− τAi,
ρAINT = f
′(kB)− TB,
ρBNAT = f
′(kB)− TB,
ρBINT = f
′(kAi)− τAi,
in which ρANAT denotes the net return to capital an individual living in country A generates
by investing in A, ρAINT is the net return an individual living in A generates from investing
abroad, that is, in country B. Analogously, ρBNAT is the net return to an individual living in
B from investing inside his home country and ρBINT is the net return for an individual from
B investing abroad. Capital invested in a region of A will then earn its marginal product,
which depends on the total amount of capital supplied in that region, that is, f ′(kAi), net
the tax burden applicable, that is, τAi. Capital invested in B will earn its marginal product
depending on the total amount invested in B net the respective tax, which is TB. Given
decreasing returns to scale, non-arbitrage must lead to the net return on capital being equal
across regions10 and countries, such that ρ = f ′(kAi)− τAi = f ′(kB)−TB, which implies that
ρ = ρ(ti=1,...,n;TA;TB).
8Given that these are assumed to be symmetric and only subject to a uniform central-level tax, it is
possible to abstain from an index for each region.
9We assume that the federal government will set one uniform tax across its jurisdiction (which does not
have to be the case, as Wrede (2002) points out).
10Which is also why it is possible to write ρANAT without an index in the ﬁrst place.
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Total capital supply is given by
n+m =
∑
kAi(ρ+ τAi) +KB(ρ+ TB),
with ρ = ρ(ti=1,...,n;TA;TB), from which follows that:
∂ρ
∂tAi
= −
∂kAi
∂tAi∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+ ∂KB
∂ρ
∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂TA
= −
∑ ∂kAi
∂TA∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+ ∂KB
∂ρ
∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂TB
= −
∂KB
∂TB∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+ ∂KB
∂ρ
∈ [−1; 0),
for which the same reasoning holds as in the previous section and where from the ﬁrst two
it can be inferred that
∂ρ
∂TA
= n
∂ρ
∂tAi
. (4.6)
4.3.2 Government Objectives
The Leviathan governments in each jurisdiction aim to maximise tax revenues by choice of
the respective tax rate, while taking into account the likely tax base reactions to given tax
policies.
State Level
The state governments i = 1, . . . , n in country A hold the following objectives:
max
tAi
ri = tAikAi(ρ+ τAi) + δπ(ρ+ τAi)
Each state will set its tax rate taking those of all other states and the national jurisdictions
(that act as Stackelberg leaders) as given, such that tAi = tAi(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB). Using
(4.1), each state’s ﬁrst-order-condition is given by
∂rAi
∂tAi
= kAi(ρ+ τAi) + b
′
iA(
∂ρ
∂tAi
+ 1) = 0. (4.7)
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where b′iA = (tAik
′
Ai − δkAi) < 0 denotes the change in regional tax base due to a respective
tax hike, which follows the same argumentation as in the previous section. It can be inferred
from (4.7) that each regional government will again account for the direct tax revenue eﬀect
generated by choice of its tax rate (as depicted by the ﬁrst term on the right hand side)
as well as the tax base eﬀect depicted by the second term in (4.7). It neglects that the
latter will raise revenues in the other jurisdictions, thereby triggering a positive horizontal
externality. Each state government further neglects that the federal tax base will possibly
be negatively aﬀected by capital not only relocating from one region to another within the
federation, but also being shifted to country B. Thereby, the local entities will trigger a
vertical externality which points towards state taxes being ineﬃciently high with respect to
consolidated revenues. The setup of the states implies that equilibrium will be characterised
by a symmetric solution in which all states set the same tax. The eﬀect of a coordinated tax
hike of all states on local government revenue is depicted by
∂rA
n∂tA
= kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+ 1). (4.8)
In order to gain insight on the sign of (4.8), equation (4.7) is substracted from (4.8), which
yields
drA
dtA
=
∂rA
n∂tA
− ∂rA
∂tA
= kA(ρ+ τA) + tAk
′
A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+ 1)
− δkA(n ∂ρ
∂tA
+ 1)− kA(ρ+ τA)
− tAk′A(
∂ρ
∂tA
+ 1) + δkA(
∂ρ
∂tA
+ 1)
= b′A(n− 1)
∂ρ
∂tA
> 0.
(4.9)
That is, state revenues would increase as a consequence of a coordinated tax hike. This
points towards state taxes being set ineﬃciently low (that is, not revenue-maximising) from
the prespective of the regional Leviathan governments. It is in line with the results from
section 4.2 and implies that the tax base eﬀect from investors relocating their capital abroad
is oﬀset by the revenue eﬀect.
Federal Level
Given the symmetric state equilibrium, the ﬁrst-mover federal government’s objective in A
is
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max
TA
RA = n[TAkA(ρ+ τA) + ΔπA(ρ+ τA)].
It bears in mind that regional governments will make their tax choice dependent on what
rate was previously set at the federal level and takes the tax rate of the federal government
in B as given. It follows that
ρ = ρ(ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TA;TB)
and its ﬁrst-order condition will be given by
∂RA
∂TA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA) + B
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+ 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
) = 0, (4.10)
in which B′A = (TAk
′
A−ΔkA) < 0 is the change in A’s federal tax base due to a respective tax
hike, analogous to the previous section. It follows from (4.10) that the federal government in
A will perfectly anticipate how its tax will aﬀect the optimal choice of its regional governments
and the corresponding impact on its tax base. It neglects the positive eﬀect on tax base in
B, thereby triggering a horizontal externality, which will become apparent further down.
Country B’s government aims to satisfy
max
TB
RB = n[TBkB(ρ+ TB) + θπB(ρ+ TB)],
for which also ρ = ρ(ti = 1, . . . , n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TA;TB). That is, it will perfectly
anticipate that its own tax has an impact on the tax rate set by the regions in the neighbouring
country.11 The ﬁrst-order-condition is given by
11Within the existing literature on ﬁscal federalism, the assumptions made with respect to the extent to
which one jurisdiction takes into account its competitors’ reaction functions diﬀer between the models and
are subject to discussion. Of course, they essentially drive the generated results. In an early contribution,
Keen (1998) examines taxation in a single federation where both levels of government are myopic. In a
later paper, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) model a federation in which the decision-makers at each level are
perfectly aware of the budget constraints at the other level. In a setting where two federations compete with
each other, Wrede (2002) assumes for both levels in each federation to ignore the budget constraint of the
other jurisdictions. Grazzini and Petretto (2007) analyse the interaction of a federal and a unitary country,
where the federal-level government in one country is assumed to be perfectly aware of the impact its own
tax rate has on the taxes set by its regions. Also, the government in the unitary country takes into account
the tax rate set at the neighbouring country’s federal level, but is ignorant of the interdependence with
regional tax rates in that country. (See also section 2.1 for further detail on the respective models.) From
this study’s perspective, it is, however, just as likely that governments of one country do take the tax rates
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∂RB
∂TB
= n[kB(ρ+ TB)
+B′B(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+ 1 +
∂tA
∂TB
)] = 0,
(4.11)
where B′B = (TBk
′
B − θkB) < 0 is the change in B’s federal tax base and works the same way
as (4.10).
Equilibrium is characterised by TA = TA(ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TB) and TB =
TB(ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TA), and further
ρ = ρ[ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TA(ti=1,...,n(◦);TB);TB(ti=1,...,n(◦);TA)] (4.12)
In order to ﬁnd out whether both governments will set their tax rates too high or too low
in equilibrium, a coordinated tax rate hike between the two federal governments is again
considered, which yields for country A:
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
= n[kA(ρ+ τA) + B
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+ 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
)]. (4.13)
In order to determine the sign of (4.13), equation (4.10), which is zero, is substracted
from (4.13) to gain
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
− ∂RA
∂TA
= n[B′A
∂ρ
∂TB
] > 0. (4.14)
That is, given the setup, federal revenues would increase following a coordinated tax
hike at the federal level. Since the federal governments perfectly anticipate the reactions
at the regional level, the result generated here is equivalent to that when only two unitary
countries are competing. Unlike the case where only one isolated federal state is analysed,
of neighbouring ‘foreign’ regions into account, irrespective of the jurisdictional level at which this rate is set.
Take the case of corporate taxation in France and Germany: it is straightforward to argue that the French
government, if it takes German corporate tax rates into account, will be aware of the eﬀective tax burden
and not limit its view to the federal level. What is more, the French government may be even more aware of
the tax rates set in the diﬀerent regions, particularly in those sharing borders with France. This model may
be restricted to symmetric equilibria across regions, yet the previous point still contributes to the validity of
the discussed assumption. Hence, while in general it may be a somewhat valid assumption for governments
to be entirely ignorant of tax reactions in other jurisdictions, this approach is built on the perception that if
governments are assumed to be aware of each other’s tax rates, then it must be mutually corresponding and
should not be restricted to decisions taken at the same level. This reasoning will be applied in what follows.
Note, however, that possible third- or higher-order interactions in tax rates are assumed to be negligible.
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the optimising Stackelberg federal government neglects the horizontal eﬀect triggered by its
own tax rate on the neighbouring country’s tax revenues. Hence, the federal governments in
their turn cause a horizontal externality leading to tax rates being chosen such that they are
not revenue-maximising. The same holds, obviously, from the perspective of government B.
4.3.3 Cross-Jurisdictional Eﬀects
What is interesting with respect to the analysis of government behaviour in this setting are
the eﬀects triggered by a tax hike in one jurisdiction, as discussed earlier, on revenues at other
levels or in other countries. In order to characterise these, the approach taken by Grazzini
and Petretto (2007) and also suggested by Wrede (2002) is followed. That is, the impact
of a tax hike in one jurisdiction on revenues of another jurisdiction can be determined by
assessing the change in equilibrium responses of that other jurisdiction. For the state level,
tAi = tAi(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB) for all i in the federation. Using (4.12), the eﬀect of a change
in the tax rate at the federal level on regional budgets is then given by
drA
dTA
= n
∂tA
∂TA
kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+ 1 + n
∂tA
∂TA
). (4.15)
Here, it can be seen that a tax hike at the federal level in A will in turn aﬀect the optimal
choice of tax rates at the regional level ( ∂tA
∂TA
). That will have an impact directly on tax
revenues as denoted by the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (4.15). Its sign depends on
the assumptions made with respect to the strategic relationship between regional and federal
tax rates. By assuming complementarity (ie. ∂tA
∂TA
> 0), it will be positive, and negative
otherwise.12 The second term denotes the tax base eﬀect triggered by the tax hike at the
federal level. Given that b′A is clearly negative, its sign hinges on the last term in brackets.
On the one hand, the tax base will be reduced as a consequence of the higher consolidated tax
rate triggered by the federal hike and the resulting shift in optimal tax rates at the regional
12The strategic relationship between tax rates of diﬀerent jurisdictions is of course subject to discussion.
The reaction curve estimated for horizontal interaction tends to be upward-sloping (see section 2.2.2), such
that for cross-national and horizontal eﬀects it is a fair approach to assume strategic complementarity. In a
federal setting, it is, however, not unlikely for the federal government to set its tax rate optimal given state
taxation, which might include lowering its tax as a response to a state-level tax hike in order for a consolidated
tax burden not to be exceeded - especially if the federal government bears the federation’s relative position to
other countries in the international context in mind. That would point towards the assumption of federal and
regional governments being strategic substitutes. The empirical evidence for federal interaction is mixed, as
discussed in section 2.2.3. In this case, with the consideration of revenue-maximising Leviathan governments
focusing only on their own budgets, the assumption of strategic complementarity might be sensible. In what
follows, the focus will lie on the case of strategic complementarity, but the implication of diﬀerent assumptions
will be highlighted where applicable.
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level (1 + n ∂tA
∂TA
). On the other hand, these shifts will each reduce the overall net return on
capital, which will attenuate the direct negative tax base eﬀect due to the tax hikes. That
is, the impact of a federal tax increase on regional revenues is not necessarily negative. It
depends on the strategic interaction of regional and federal tax rates. The obvious eﬀect
is the negative top-down externality resulting from the loss of regional tax base due to the
higher consolidated tax burden. Then again, if, as a response to the federal hike, the regions
choose to raise their tax rates (that is, if ∂tA
∂TA
), they will generate a positive tax revenue eﬀect
and at the same time further augment the tax base eﬀect. The relative size of these two will
then drive the sign of (4.15). If it is greater than zero, it points towards federal tax rates
being ineﬃciently low. If it is less than zero, it points towards the vertical externality leading
to federal tax rates being ineﬃciently high from the perspective of the revenue-maximising
regional Leviathan government. In order to determine the sign of (4.15), applying (4.6), it
can be rewritten as
drA
dTA
=
∂tA
∂TA
kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂tA
∂TA
) + 1 + n
∂tA
∂TA
). (4.16)
Here, it becomes clear that the last term in brackets will be unambiguously greater than zero,
if tax rates are strategic complements, given that 0 < ∂ρ
∂TA
< −1 and 1 + n ∂tA
∂TA
> 1 + ∂tA
∂TA
.
Hence, the two terms on the RHS of (4.16) have opposite signs, such that the total eﬀect
depends on the relative magnitude of the tax income eﬀect generated from the shift in regional
level tax rates, as opposed to the tax base eﬀect triggered from the reaction of investors to the
changed investment conditions in the respective jurisdiction. That is, depending on whether
the reaction of tax rates is assumed to be more elastic than the reaction of the tax base
towards a change in net return on capital, one eﬀect will outweigh the other.
A coordinated tax hike by the regions in A, as considered in section 4.3.2, will aﬀect equi-
librium federal revenue as follows, bearing in mind that
TA = TA(ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB);TB) and TB = TB(ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;
TA;TB);TA):
dRA
dtA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
+B′A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂TA
∂TA
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tA
+ 1 +
∂TA
∂tA
)],
(4.17)
from which it can be inferred that the equilibrium responses of national tax rates in both
countries will change as a consequence of a coordinated tax rate hike at the regional level
(∂TA
∂tA
and ∂TB
∂tA
). A’s change in federal tax rate will have a direct income eﬀect, depending
on the strategic relationship between national-level and regional-level tax rates, as depicted
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by the ﬁrst term in squared brackets. The tax base eﬀect will again be driven by the tax
increase at the regional level and the resulting shift in the optimal federal tax rate. Further,
investors will relocate their investments due to a change in net return to capital, which is
triggered by the tax hike at the regional level as well as by the change in optimal tax rates
set at the federal level in A and in B. The sign of the latter is in turn driven by the strategic
relationship of TA and TB with tA and will either augment the impact of the regional tax on
ρ (if ∂TA
∂tA
> 0 and ∂TB
∂tA
> 0) or otherwise attenuate it. Assuming again for tax rates to be
strategic complements, it becomes apparent that the sign of the tax base eﬀect and, thus,
the sign of (4.17), will again hinge on the magnitude of the reduction in net return on capital
in contrast to the tax hikes at the federal and regional level. Rewriting (4.17) yields
dRA
dtA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
) + 1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tA
)].
(4.18)
It can be seen that given −1 < ∂ρ
∂TA
< 0, it follows that ∂ρ
∂TA
(1+n∂TA
∂tA
)+1+n∂TA
∂tA
will be greater
than zero, such that the sign of the tax base eﬀect is ambiguous. It will be negative, such
that (4.18) becomes positive, if the elasticity of the federal tax rate in B as a response to the
tax regime change in A is suﬃciently large for the total eﬀect on the tax base in A (triggered
by tax rises on both levels and attenuated by the corresponding drop in the net return on
capital) to be oﬀset. Otherwise, the tax base eﬀect will be negative, such that the sign of
(4.18) depends on the relative magnitudes of the tax base eﬀect and the direct tax income
eﬀect in A. Now, what this tells us is that if regions in A agree upon a revenue-increasing
tax hike, on the one hand, for assumed strategic complementarity of tax rates, the federal
government will realise an increase in tax income, which may be named a positive bottom-up
vertical externality. On the other hand, the coordinated hike will cause a reduction in tax
base due to the higher tax burden and the lower net return to capital, which might be called
a ﬁrst-order negative vertical externality. What is more, that eﬀect will be enhanced by the
complementary reaction of federal tax rates in A, but on the other hand oﬀset to a certain
degree by the complementary reaction of national tax rates in B (due to which country A
becomes in turn more attractive for investors). The relative magnitude of these last two
eﬀects drives the sign of the total tax base eﬀect.13 Consider the (possibly more likely) case
where the government’s reaction in B is not suﬃciently strong for the tax base eﬀect of the
coordinated hike and the resulting rise at the federal level to be oﬀset: Then the impact of
13That is, the across-country vertical externality resulting from a regional-level tax increase may act by
limiting the reduction of federal revenues in A. Put diﬀerently, by raising taxes, A’s regional governments
could attenuate the horizontal externalities triggered by across-border tax competition at the federal level.
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a coordinated regional tax increase on federal revenues in A in turn depends on whether the
tax income eﬀect realised by the federal government is suﬃciently large to outweigh the tax
base reduction, which again hinges on how elastically capital owners react towards a given
change in tax regime.14
With respect to the cross-national eﬀects of tax hikes, the impact of a higher federal tax
in B on regional budgets in A is given by
drA
dTB
= n
∂tA
∂TB
kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+
∂tA
∂TB
). (4.19)
Here, obviously, the tax base eﬀect tends to be positive, albeit it is at least alleviated by
the triggered shift in optimal regional tax rates, if strategic complementarity is assumed.
The impact is further ampliﬁed by the corresponding tax income eﬀect. Depending on how
pronounced that reaction in A will be, the positive tax base eﬀect may even be inverted,
such that the overall sign would then again hinge on the relative size of tax revenue and tax
base eﬀect. Notwithstanding the interesting implications, this would, of course, call for quite
extreme reactions by the Leviathan governments in A. Yet such an eﬀect is theoretically
possible. With respect to the magnitude of tax rate reactions, it is further interesting to note
that ∂tA
∂TB
is likely to be rather small. In any case, compared to (4.16), it seems reasonable
to assume that the cross-national elasticities diﬀer from the inner-national elasticities (ie.
∂tA
∂TB
	= ∂tA
∂TA
). For example, German ‘La¨nder’ might react diﬀerently to a higher tax rate at
the federal level as opposed to a tax rate hike of national tax rates in France. Not only may
this be due to the fact that the awareness of tax base reactions may not be the same across
nations. What is more, depending on the regional proximity to France, some regions may
be quite directly aﬀected by tax rates set in France (take Saarland or Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
for example), while others (such as Saxonia or Schleswig-Holstein) are not. These former
regions’ tax bases will then again be directly aﬀected by diﬀerent tax regimes in France, to
which they might have an incentive to react. On the other hand, they will still be competing
with other German regions, which, for their part, might have no intention of directly reacting
towards taxes set in France, given that the impact on their tax base is rather limited. Hence,
cross-national elasticities may diﬀer across regions within one country and, on average, be
lower than inner-national elasticities. This would, of course, make a case for the consideration
14Obviously, one might argue that the assumption of strategic complementarity of tax rates across all
jurisdictions does not make much sense. The federal government might rather choose to react towards a
coordinated hike at the regional level by lowering its tax rate in order for a more favourable international
position to be achieved. The model does give the necessary tools to analyse such behaviour at the federal
level, but the discussion of all possible types of reactions would be beyond the scope of this study and is left
to the interested reader.
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of non-symmetric equilibria, yet in the same time corroborates the assumption of a diﬀerence
in ‘average’ sensitivity with respect to foreign national tax rates.
Likewise, the impact of an isolated tax hike in B on the federal budget in A is described
by
dRA
dTB
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂TB
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+
∂ρ
∂TA
∂TA
∂TB
+
∂TA
∂TB
+
∂tA
∂TB
)],
(4.20)
for which similar argumentations regarding the direct revenue and the tax base eﬀect hold as
for (4.19), except that the triggered change in federal tax rates and the change in tax rates set
by the following regions further attenuate the latter. Hence, cross-national strategic reactions
will in both cases lead to the positive impact of a tax hike in B on revenues in the respective
jurisdictional level in A to be depleted by the strategic reaction of A’s jurisdictions.15
The impact of a federal tax hike in A on revenues in B is given by
dRB
dTA
=n[kB(ρ+ TB)
∂TB
∂TA
+B′B(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
+
∂TB
∂TA
+ n
∂TB
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
)],
(4.21)
which basically follows the same line of argumentation as (4.20), except that it might again
be possible that ∂tA
∂TA
	= ∂tA
∂TB
, such that (4.20) and (4.21) might diﬀer.
4.3.4 Total Revenue Eﬀects
Assume that the Leviathan governments of a country are required to provide a certain share
of their revenues to the citizenship, which will be used for the provision of public goods.
Then, the inhabitants of that country will be positively aﬀected by the chosen policies and
the question whether any tax reform will maximise total revenues within the entire federation
becomes relevant. The total eﬀect of a coordinated tax hike by the regions in A is given by
dRA
dtA
+
drA
dtA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
) + 1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tA
)]
+ b′A(n− 1)
∂ρ
∂tA
,
(4.22)
15With assumed strategic substitutability of tax rates, of course, the question to be asked would be whether
the negative direct revenue eﬀect thus triggered could be oﬀset by the further ampliﬁcation of the tax base
eﬀect.
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in which the eﬀect on regional budgets (third line) is clearly positive and that on federal
budgets (ﬁrst two lines) is ambiguous. Whether or not the entire term becomes positive,
depends on the elasticity of the tax regime in B with respect to the tax rate chosen in
the regions of country A. If the latter is suﬃciently large, the total eﬀect is positive and
consolidated revenues will rise following a tax hike at the regional level. If it is not, the sign
of (4.22) hinges on the relative magnitudes of the tax base eﬀect as opposed to the income
eﬀect generated from the tax hike as well as that of the (positive) eﬀect on revenues in the
regions. (4.22) can be rewritten as
dRA
dtA
+
drA
dtA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
) + 1 + n
∂TA
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tA
)
b′A(
1
n
− 1
n2
)(
∂ρ
∂TA
)],
(4.23)
where it can be seen that for n suﬃciently large, the third line becomes zero, such that
the sign of (4.23) is deﬁned in the same way as (4.18) and hinges on the relative size of
the generated tax income and tax base eﬀect. These are in turn driven by the strategic
interactions of tax rates and the elasticity of the tax base.
The eﬀect of a federal tax hike on consolidated revenues is depicted by
dRA
dTA
+
drA
dTA
= n[B′A
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
]+
∂tA
∂TA
kA(ρ+ τA)+
b′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+ 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
),
which can also be expressed as
dRA
dTA
+
drA
dTA
= n[B′A
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
]+
∂tA
∂TA
kA(ρ+ τA)+
b′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂tA
∂TA
) + 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
),
(4.24)
where, if strategic complementarity is assumed throughout, the ﬁrst two lines will be clearly
positive, while the third line will be negative. Whether or not the total eﬀect is positive
depends on whether the reduction of regional tax base in A (due to the higher consolidated
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tax rate and the corresponding reduction in net return to capital) can by oﬀset by the tax
revenue gain at the regional level, which results from the higher regional tax rates and the
increase in federal tax base triggered by the tax rate hike in B as a response to the federal
tax hike in A. That is, a clear prediction of whether a tax hike at the federal level would
raise total revenues in A cannot be given.
4.4 Interaction of Two Federal States
The next case considered is that of two federations competing for mobile tax base. The basic
setup is the same as in the previous section, except that now, country B also has a federal
structure, such that in every country, each region’s inhabitant has the choice of investing
capital in any region i = 1, . . . , n of country A or in any region g = 1, . . . ,m of country
B with capital tax rates set at both levels in both countries. The three stages of decision-
making are characterised the following way: Both federal governments choose their tax rates
ﬁrst. Subsequently, the regional governments in A and B choose their tax rates taking the
taxes set previously at the federal level as given. Then, the inhabitants of every region choose
where to invest their capital.
4.4.1 Capital Investment
The investment decisions by each individual are characterised in line with those in section
4.3.1, except that the federal structure of country B is now also explicitly recognised. That
is, capital supply in each of B’s regions is given by
kBg = kBgNAT + k
∗
gA,
where g = 1, . . . ,m stands for each region in B, kBgNAT denotes the amount of capital
available in B that is actually invested in region g, k∗gA depicts the amount of capital available
in A that is invested in region g of country B.
All capital invested inside region g of country B will be subject to the consolidated tax
rate τBg = tBg + TB, where the ﬁrst is the tax rate levied by region g and the latter denotes
the tax rate levied by the federal government in B. Capital provision and taxation in country
A is deﬁned the same way as in section 4.3.1. Investment decisions will be such that
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ρANAT = f
′(kAi)− τAi,
ρAINT = f
′(kBg)− τBg,
ρBNAT = f
′(kBg)− τBg,
ρBINT = f
′(kAi)− τAi,
which follows the same lines as in section 4.3.1.
Non-arbitrage will again lead to the net return on capital being equalised across jurisdic-
tions, such that total capital supply is now given by
n+m =
∑
kAi(ρ+ τAi) +
∑
kBg(ρ+ τBg),
with ρ = ρ(tAi=1,...,n;TA;TB; tBg=1,...,m), from which follows that:
∂ρ
∂tAi
= −
∂kAi
∂tAi∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+
∑ ∂kBg
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂TA
= −
∑ ∂kAi
∂TA∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+
∑ ∂kBg
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂tBg
= −
∂kBg
∂tBg∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+
∑ ∂kBg
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0),
∂ρ
∂TB
= −
∑ ∂kB
∂TB∑ ∂kAi
∂ρ
+
∑ ∂kBg
∂ρ
< 0 ∈ [−1; 0),
which is analogous to section 4.3.1. It also follows that
∂ρ
∂TA
= n
∂ρ
∂tAi
(4.25)
and
∂ρ
∂TB
= m
∂ρ
∂tBg
. (4.26)
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4.4.2 Government Objectives
State Level
The government decisions will be analysed for country A, given that the federal setup of
both A and B is such that the eﬀects will be the same regardless of the perspective taken.
Each region aims to maximise revenues by choice of its tax rate, while taking taxes set
in the other regions (also those of country B) and federal tax rates as given, such that
tAi = tAi(tAj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; tBg=1,...,m). The objective is again
max
tAi
ri = tAikAi(ρ+ τAi) + δπAi(ρ+ τAi),
where ρ = ρ(tAi=1,...,n;TA;TB; tBg=1,...,m) and each state’s ﬁrst-order-condition is given by
∂rAi
∂tAi
= kAi(ρ+ τAi) + b
′
Ai(
∂ρ
∂tAi
+ 1) = 0, (4.27)
from which the same conclusions as in section 4.3 can be drawn. The analogous objective
holds for regional budgets in B, such that
tBg = tBg(tBh =g=1,...,m−1;TA;TB; ti=1,...,n).
Hence, equilibrium will be characterised by the tax choices of every region in A as well as in
country B, which will each aﬀect the net return on capital, such that
ρ = ρ[tAi=1,...,n(tAj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; tBg=1,...,m(◦));TA;TB;
tBg=1,...,m(tBh =g=1,...,m−1;TA;TB; tAi=1,...,n(◦))].
It will further be characterised by symmetric strategies not only of the states in A but also
of those in B.
In order to ﬁnd out whether or not tax rates established in the one-shot Nash game will be
too high or too low from the perspective of the revenue-maximising Leviathan, a coordinated
tax hike at the regional level is again considered. The equilibrium eﬀect of a coordinated
hike in A on regional budgets in A is given by
∂rA
n∂tA
= kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂tA
+ 1). (4.28)
That is, the budget is not only aﬀected by the reduction in the net return on capital due
to the tax hike in A. That hike also triggers an adaption of chosen tax rates in all of B’s
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regions, which will in turn aﬀect the net return on capital, thereby reducing the loss of
tax base following the hike in A. The optimising regional government does not take these
horizontal eﬀects into account. Substracting (4.27) from (4.28) yields
∂rA
n∂tA
− ∂rA
∂tA
= b′A[(n− 1)
∂ρ
∂tA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂tA
]. (4.29)
Hence, the sign of (4.29) hinges on the assumed relationship between regional taxes in the
two countries, that is, ∂tB
∂tA
. Assuming strategic complementarity, the total eﬀect will be
clearly positive, which is in accordance with the standard result16 stating that the Leviathan
government would proﬁt from a rise in tax rates.17 That would point towards tax rates
being set ineﬃciently low from the perspective of the revenue-maximising regional Leviathan
government. In contrast, if tax rates are strategic substitutes, the revenue eﬀect depends on
the elasticity of tax rates in B towards those set in A (∂tB
∂tA
) as well as on the relative size
of both countries. The larger B is compared to A, the more likely its reaction towards tax
hikes in A will be to oﬀset the revenue-increasing eﬀect of that tax hike for A.
If there was a chance for binding across-country agreements, the eﬀect of a coordinated
hike of all regions both in A and in B on the budget of a representative region in A would
be given by:
∂rA
∂(ntA +mtB)
= kA(ρ+ τA) + b
′
A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
+ 1), (4.30)
where the diﬀerence to (4.29) is that ∂tB
∂tA
= 1. Substracting (4.27) from (4.30) yields
drA
dtA
=
∂rA
∂(ntA +mtB)
− ∂rA
∂tA
= b′A[(n− 1)
∂ρ
∂tA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
] > 0. (4.31)
That is, regional budgets in A (and B) would clearly increase following a coordinated tax
hike in both countries. Hence, horizontal tax competition again seems to restrain Leviathan
governments in their revenue-maximising ambitions.
Federal Level
The federal government in country A chooses its own tax rate taking that of the other
country’s federal decision-maker as given. It is aware of the fact that the lower-level tax
16See, for example, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2003).
17From (4.29) it becomes apparent that, under the assumption of strategic complementarity of regional
tax rates across countries, it would always be revenue-enhancing for the Leviathan government to raise tax
rates. That is, even if regional governments in one country do not have any across-country tax agreements,
they can still proﬁt from a unilateral tax rise within their own jurisdiction if the strategic reaction of the
other country is complementary. Obviously, such behaviour would not lead to an equilibrium.
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rates are set as functions of all the other tax rates, which it will perfectly anticipate, not only
for all of its own regions, but also for all regions of country B. The federal government in B
faces the same situation, from which it can be inferred that
TA = TA[ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; tg=1,...,m);TB;
tg=1,...,m(th =g=1,...,m−1;TA;TB; ti=1,...,n)]
and
TB = TB[ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; tg=1,...,m);TA;
tg=1,...,m(th =g=1,...,m−1;TA;TB; ti=1,...,n)].
The objective of the federal government in A can thus be described by
max
TA
RA = n[TAkA(ρ+ τA) + Δπ(ρ+ τA)], (4.32)
and its ﬁrst order condition is given by
∂RA
∂TA
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
+ 1 + n
∂tA
∂TA
)] = 0.
(4.33)
That is, the federal government in A will take into account the reaction at the regional
level in response to its chosen tax rate. It will, however, neglect the fact that its tax regime
aﬀects the optimal choice of tax rate at the federal level in B. Hence, in equilibrium
ρ = ρ[ti=1,...,n(tj =i=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; tg=1,...,n(◦));
TA(ti=1,...,n(◦);TB; ti=1,...,n(◦));
TB(ti=1,...,n(◦);TA; ti=1,...,n(◦));
tg=1,...,n(th =g=1,...,n−1;TA;TB; ti=1,...,n(◦))]
(4.34)
and the equilibrium reaction in response to a tax hike in A is depicted by
∂eRA
∂eTA
= n[kA(ρ+ τA)
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
+ 1 + n
∂tA
∂TA
)].
(4.35)
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Substracting (4.33) from (4.35) to ﬁnd out the sign of the latter yields
dRA
dTA
=
∂eRA
∂e(TA)
− ∂RA
∂TA
= n[B′A
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
]. (4.36)
Equation (4.36) captures the horizontal externality triggered by a tax hike at the federal level
in A. Its sign essentially hinges on the assumption regarding the strategic relationship be-
tween federal tax rates in the two countries. Again, for strategic complements the horizontal
externality will be positive, pointing towards tax rates being ineﬃciently low from the per-
spective of the revenue-maximising Leviathan government. If they are strategic substitutes,
it will be negative.
If federal governments in both countries had an incentive to cooperate, the eﬀect of a
coordinated tax hike at the federal level in both countries on federal revenues in A would be
characterised by
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)+
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂(TA + TB)
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂(TA + TB)
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂(TA + TB)
+ 1 + n
∂tA
∂(TA + TB)
)].
(4.37)
Again, equation (4.33) is substracted from (4.37) to ﬁnd out the sign of the latter, which
yields
dRA
dTA + TB
=
∂RA
∂(TA + TB)
− ∂RA
∂TA
=
n[B′A(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TB
)].
(4.38)
Assuming for tax rates at the regional level in both countries to be strategic complements
with respect to the tax rate set at the federal level in B, (4.38) will be greater than zero. On
the other hand, if they were strategic substitutes, the sign would hinge on the elasticity of
regional tax rates in both countries with respect to federal tax rates in B as opposed to the
eﬀect on net return to capital triggered by the federal tax hike in B. That is, by dropping
the assumption of tax rates being strategic complements, the revenue-increasing eﬀect of a
coordinated hike across countries is no longer clear.
4.4.3 Cross-Jurisdictional Eﬀects
In order to determine the eﬀects triggered by a tax hike at the federal or regional level on
revenues generated at the other levels, the impact of the resulting changes in the equilibrium
81
Lisa Tillmann Federal Tax Competition
choices of tax rates on revenues is again considered. For a tax hike at the regional level in
A, the eﬀect on A’s federal revenues is characterised by
dRA
dtA
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
B′A(n
∂ρ
∂tA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂tA
+
∂ρ
∂TA
∂TA
∂tA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tA
+ 1 +
∂TA
∂tA
)],
which, using (4.25) and (4.26), can be rewritten as
dRA
dtA
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
B′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂TA
∂tA
) + 1 +
∂TA
∂tA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
(
∂tB
∂tA
+
∂TB
∂tA
))].
(4.39)
That is, the impact of a change in tax regime at the regional level in A on the budget of
the federal government in A is driven by the elasticity of the reaction of tax rates at both
levels in B to the change in tax regime in A. Equation (4.39) follows the same lines as
(4.18) in the case of a federation competing with a unitary state, except that an additional
vertical across-country eﬀect results from the state level governments in B reacting in their
optimal response tax rates to the choices made by A’s regional governments, thereby having
an impact on federal revenues. In the case of strategic complementarity, the reactions at both
levels in country B will attenuate the tax base eﬀects resulting from the tax rate increase in
A. Not only will investors be faced with a reduction in net return to capital for investments
due to the higher tax in A, they will also encounter less favourable investment conditions in
the other country as a result of the strategic interaction in A and B, which in turn reduces
their incentive to relocate investments. That is, the cross-national eﬀects at both levels will
make it more likely for the tax hike at the regional level to raise federal revenues.
In order to assess the eﬀect of a federal tax increase on regional budgets, the resulting
change in equilibrium tax choices can be characterised by:
drA
dTA
=kA(ρ+ τA)
∂tA
∂TA
+ b′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
+ 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
),
(4.40)
which, using (4.25) and (4.26), can be rewritten as
drA
dTA
=kA(ρ+ τA)
∂tA
∂TA
+ b′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂tA
∂TA
) + 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
+m
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
).
(4.41)
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The sign of (4.41) essentially hinges on the magnitude of m ∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
. Assuming again strategic
complementarity of tax rates, that term will be negative. Just as in section 4.3.3, the rest of
the second line of (4.41) will be positive. Hence, if that last eﬀect is suﬃciently large (that is,
if regional tax rates in B react suﬃciently elastically towards a tax hike in A to outweigh the
total impact on the tax base triggered by the changes in regional and federal tax rates in A),
the tax base eﬀect and, hence, (4.41) will be positive, pointing towards federal taxation being
ineﬃciently low for the regional Leviathans.18 Otherwise, the same argumentation holds as
in section 4.3.3. That is, in contrast to the case of a federal country competing with a unitary
state, if two federations interact, the horizontal competition eﬀect is made more signiﬁcant
by means of the additional reaction of state governments in country B. In consequence, just
as before, a tax hike at the federal level becomes more likely to increase regional revenues,
given that the corresponding reaction in B’s regions may alleviate the loss of tax base. That
implies that the existence of vertical externalities that leads to ineﬃciently high federal tax
rates is made less signiﬁcant through the across-country eﬀects arising at both levels of B.
The impact of a federal tax hike in B on regional revenues in A can be discerned by
drA
dTB
=kA(ρ+ τA)
∂tA
∂TB
+ b′A(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TB
+
∂tA
∂TB
),
(4.42)
for which the same reasoning holds as for (4.19), except that the positive eﬀect on A’s regional
tax base is further intensiﬁed by the strategic reaction at the regional level in B.
The change in A’s federal budgets following a shift in tax regime in country B can be
described by
dRA
dTB
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂TB
+B′A(
∂ρ
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂TB
+
∂ρ
∂TA
∂TA
∂TB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TB
+
∂TA
∂TB
+
∂tA
∂TB
)].
(4.43)
Here, the same conjectures hold as for (4.20), except that the tax base reduction is further
attenuated by the possible change in the optimal choice of tax rates at the regional level of
country B, which in turn leads to the total eﬀect being more likely to be positive. Likewise,
the impact of a tax hike at the regional level in B on federal revenues in A is given by
18The magnitude of m ∂ρ∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
is also aﬀected by the elasticity of the net return to capital with respect to
B’s regional tax rate as well as B’s relative size compared to A (ie. m opposed to n).
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dRA
dtB
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tB
+B′A(n
∂ρ
∂tB
+ n
∂ρ
∂tA
∂tA
∂tB
+
∂ρ
∂TA
∂TA
∂tB
+
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂tB
+
∂tA
∂tB
+
∂TA
∂tB
)],
(4.44)
which follows the same argumentation as (4.43).
4.4.4 Total Revenue Eﬀects
The eﬀect of a federal tax hike in A on total revenues within the federation is described by
dRA
dTA
+
drA
dTA
=n[B′A(
∂ρ
∂TB
∂TB
∂TA
)] + kA(ρ+ τA)
∂tA
∂TA
+ b′A(
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂tA
∂TA
) + 1 +
∂tA
∂TA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂TA
),
(4.45)
which will be greater than zero, if the elasticity of tax rates in the neighbouring regions is
suﬃciently high, such that the overall tax base eﬀect will be positive. Otherwise, the sign of
(4.45) depends on the relative magnitudes of the tax base eﬀect at the federal level (resulting
from the tax response in B) and the tax revenue eﬀect at the regional level (which are both
positive) in contrast to the (negative) tax base eﬀect at the regional level. These are in turn
essentially driven by the relative magnitudes of the strategic reactions of tax rates in A and
B, respectively. The total impact of a regional tax hike in A is depicted by
dRA
dtA
+
drA
dtA
=n[kA(ρ+ τA)
∂TA
∂tA
+B′A(n
∂ρ
∂TA
(1 +
∂TA
∂tA
) + 1 +
∂TA
∂tA
+
∂ρ
∂TB
(
∂tB
∂tA
+
∂TB
∂tA
)]
b′A[(n− 1)
∂ρ
∂tA
+ n
∂ρ
∂tB
∂tB
∂tA
],
(4.46)
which will clearly be greater than zero, if the elasticity of tax rates at the federal and regional
level in B is suﬃciently high. Otherwise, it depends on the relative magnitude of the tax
base eﬀect in A’s regions and the revenue eﬀect at the federal level (which are both positive)
in contrast to the tax base eﬀect at the federal level (which will then be negative).
4.5 Summary
The aim of this chapter was to enhance the discussion of eﬃcient capital taxation in the
light of international capital market integration by examining the impact of a change in a
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country’s federal framework on tax setting. The model is restricted to a very basic setup.
Notwithstanding its simplicity, it helps to specify each relative eﬀect of a tax regime change
on revenues in one particular jurisdiction. While the total impact of the speciﬁed eﬀects is
ambiguous, the results can be summarised as follows:
In the reference case of two competing unitary states, governments would proﬁt from a
coordinated tax hike, which points towards tax rates being set ineﬃciently low in equilibrium.
This follows from the broadly discussed horizontal externalities caused by each government
neglecting the positive eﬀect their own tax rate choice might have on another country’s tax
base.
With the introduction of a federal layer in one of the countries, the upper-level as well
as the lower-level governments will be subject to horizontal tax competition and tend to
set tax rates ineﬃciently low, that is, not revenue-maximising from their perspective, in
equilibrium. The ‘standard’ negative vertical externality triggered by tax-setting at diﬀerent
levels of government within a federation (which points towards regional tax rates being set
ineﬀciently high from the point of view of the federal Leviathan and vice versa) is then
accompanied by positive cross-national vertical externalities from the regions of the federation
to the upper-level unitary government (which point towards regional tax rates being set
ineﬃciently low from the perspective of the foreign country) and vice versa. While it is
easily validated that their own tax rates will be set ineﬃciently low from the perspective of
each revenue-maximising Leviathan government, the results regarding the cross-jurisdictional
revenue eﬀects and thus also the impact of a tax hike in one jurisdiction on consolidated
revenues, are ambiguous. If one jurisdiction increases taxes, it triggers a tax base eﬀect and
a tax revenue eﬀect in the other jurisdictions. The tax base eﬀect is driven by the respective
externalities just outlined. It tends to be negative for two jurisdictions at diﬀerent levels
within the same country. It tends to be positive for cross-national revenue eﬀects of tax
regime changes. The sign in each case hinges on the elasticity of the net return on capital
and the elasticity of the other governments’ tax rate response to a given tax rate change. The
latter is incurred by the fact that the equilibrium tax rate for one jurisdiction will change
given a tax hike in another jurisdiction, which may further augment or attenuate the tax base
eﬀect. That strategic reaction in tax rates also feeds into the tax income eﬀect, which will be
positive if considered tax rates are strategic complements, and negative otherwise. Tax base
eﬀect and tax income eﬀect tend to have opposite signs, such that the total impact of a tax
reform in one jurisdiction on revenues in another jurisdiction (and, thus, the answer to the
question whether the respective tax rates will be too high or too low from the perspective
of the other jurisdiction) is ambiguous and essentially hinges on the relative elasticity of tax
rates in contrast to the elasticity of the net return on capital to a given tax rate.
If both countries considered have a federal setup, the results change in such that another
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layer of cross-national eﬀects will be incurred by a tax hike. For one, horizontal competition is
intensiﬁed across borders at the regional level. The revenue-increasing eﬀect of a coordinated
tax hike within one country is then either attenuated or augmented depending on the assumed
strategic reaction of regional tax rates in the other country. The federal-level governments
are still subject to horizontal competition and tend to set taxes ineﬃciently low. The impact
of a tax reform in one jurisdiction on revenues in other jurisdictions of other levels is again
ambiguous. Basically, the same argumentation holds as in the previous case, except that the
cross-national tax competition eﬀects are now augmented by the strategic reaction of regions
in the second federation.
In summary, the recognition of international tax competition functions by cross-national
reactions at the central level attenuating the upward pressure on consolidated tax rates
resulting from a country’s federal structure. If both countries are federations, these cross-
national eﬀects are further intensiﬁed by tax interactions at the regional level.
The model may be extended to yield further meaningful results by including heterogeneity
among lower-level regions. A variation in the order of tax rate choices (such that one of the
competing countries moves ﬁrst with the other one following) may make the setup more
realistic. What is more, notwithstanding some empirical support, the discussion in every
section made it clear that it is far from satisfying to assume that all tax rates will be set as
strategic complements. While this may be valid for the case of cross-country interactions, it
need not be for the strategic interaction of federal and state level governments within one
country. Furthermore, the magnitude of the tax rate responses, which drives the sign of the
total eﬀect, may also diﬀer between jurisdictions. Given that the empirical evidence on the
strategic interaction between diﬀerent levels of government is mixed, it may be wise to try
and depict the impact of tax regime changes bearing very carefully in mind the respective
situation.
Nonetheless, the model provides an opportunity to have a rough estimate of the revenue
eﬀects triggered by a possible tax regime change, while allowing for very speciﬁc individual
assumptions with respect to the strategic interaction of tax rates between diﬀerent levels of
government and countries to be made.
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Conclusion
The aim of this study was to set out the current state of research on international federal
tax competition and to add further insight to the discussion in two ways: By analysing how
the degree of integration into international capital markets aﬀects chosen tax rates and by
examining how the federal framework of a country aﬀects its position in the competition for
an internationally mobile capital tax base. In what follows, the derived results will again be
summarised and their possible implications for tax policy evaluation will be discussed.
5.1 Summary of Results
The existing theoretical literature suggests that horizontal tax competition leads to ineﬃ-
ciently low levels of taxation. That tendency may for example be oﬀset by accounting for
possible asymmetries between regions or agglomeration rents. The consideration of tax base
overlap between diﬀerent levels of government points towards ineﬃciently high tax rates.
Which of these dominates is subject to a variety of aspects. The vertical externality is likely
to dominate if a country is strongly integrated into international capital markets, if capi-
tal supply is very elastic with regard to the net interest prevalent in one region or if the
reverse is the case for capital demand. By including tax competition between federations,
the resulting cross-national externalities point towards ineﬃciently low tax rates, such that
the inner-national vertical externality is less likely to dominate. The evaluation of resulting
equilibria also hinges on the assumption with regard to policymakers being benevolent or
Leviathans.
The empirical evidence is aﬃrmative of horizontal tax interaction, while a trend towards
a more diﬀerentiated view recognising agglomeration eﬀects and regionalisation has enriched
the results. The evidence on vertical tax interaction diﬀers signiﬁcantly across countries and
approaches.
Chapters 3 and 4 extend the small existing literature on federal taxation with a par-
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ticular focus on the internationalisation of capital tax competition. Chapter 3 develops an
approach in which the intensity of competition for mobile capital tax base is explicitly mod-
elled and incorporated into the analysis. It establishes the result that a federation’s degree of
international capital market integration functions by reducing the relative importance of the
horizontal externality as opposed to the vertical externality, given that capital tax base can
be shifted more ﬂexibly abroad. It is further shown that for a speciﬁc degree of international
capital market integration, vertical and horizontal externalities may oﬀset each other.
Chapter 4 takes a more detailed look at international competition for a mobile tax base
with regard to a country’s federal structure. It analyses the impact of tax regime changes
on individual and consolidated revenues by giving a detailed overview of the speciﬁc eﬀects
triggered in each jurisdiction. In summary, by considering two competing countries, the tax
choices taken at each distinct level not only aﬀect revenues within the country, but also across
the borders. Next to the immediate impact on revenues due to tax base reactions, tax regimes
in the neighbouring country may change as a consequence of a tax hike at home. That is,
for a federation competing with a unitary country, the ﬁrst-mover central level governments
become subject to horizontal competition and subsequently tend to set taxes ineﬃciently low.
The vertical externalities triggered by one government at the regional level feed back not only
to its own central-level incumbent (negative vertical externality), but also to that of the other
country (positive vertical externality). In the reverse case, the regional government in one
country is also subject to vertical externalities not only generated by the federal government
at home, but also by that abroad, each pointing in opposite directions. The introduction of a
two-levelled government in both countries further intensiﬁes the horizontal tax competition
eﬀects in each jurisdiction. That is, next to the cross-national eﬀects triggered by the upper-
level governments, the regions in both countries now each cause the sketched externalities.
These cross-national interactions work by potentially counteracting the vertical tax external-
ities triggered within one federation. The explicit recognition of another competing country
hence points towards the relevance of vertical tax externalities as a source of ineﬃciently high
tax rates being reduced. The extent to which this occurs essentially hinges on the relative
strategic relationship between tax rates in the respective jurisdictions, the sensitivity of that
relationship and the relative size of the two countries considered.
From a diﬀerent perspective, chapter 4 also implies that two competing unitary countries
will ﬁnd themselves in equilibria with ineﬃciently low tax rates.1 With the consideration
of competing federations, the probability of ineﬃciently low taxation will be reduced from
the perspective of the individual federation as well as from an aggregate view.2 As such,
the results by chapter 4 have two dimensions: In contrast to the standard result of taxation
1See section 4.2.
2See sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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within one isolated federation,3 the recognition of another competing country points towards
the probability of the vertical externality dominating the horizontal externality being reduced.
In contrast to the standard tax competition result, chapter 4 indicates for the probability
of ineﬃciently low tax rates in equilibrium to be reduced by taking into account the federal
structure of a country.
With regard to the ﬁrst aspect derived from chapter 4, the results derived in chapters
3 and 4 indicate that the consideration of capital market integration points in the opposite
direction to the recognition of cross-national interactions. That is, in a country with a high
degree of openness, the vertical externality resulting from federal structure will be more likely
to dominate, while the interdependence of a federation with another country will result in
the vertical externality being less likely to dominate as a consequence of tax rate interaction
and tax base eﬀects. The results have been generated from two distinct models considering
revenue-maximisers in one case and welfare-maximisers in the other, and need to be directly
compared with caution.4 They may nonetheless point towards a more diﬀerentiated view of
globalisation and EU integration, as will be discussed in the following section.
5.2 Policy Implications
The introduction has outlined the following main ﬁelds of policy relevance for this study:
(i) the worldwide integration of capital markets and a resulting higher degree of capital
mobility; (ii) EU integration and enlargement, with the consequence of competition within
its borders between several countries of diﬀerent federal frameworks; (iii) the increasing role
of the European Union as an active player in its own right competing with other economic
regions and the possible introduction of an EU-level tax; (iv) a worldwide trend towards
decentralisation. The implications of the derived results with regard to these issues shall be
outlined in this section.
In a synthesis of the existing literature, four key aspects, as formulated in chapter 2.3,
need to be borne in mind with regard to the evaluation of tax policies. For one, horizontal
tax interactions ought to be accounted for with regard to the heterogeneity of competing
regions. Next to possible asymmetries across regions, a country’s federal composition as well
as that of the competing countries signiﬁcantly shapes how it is aﬀected by tax competition.
It is further useful to analyse whether or not the considered tax policies are more likely
to be shaped by revenue or welfare maximising intentions of a decision-maker. Finally,
3See section 2.1.2.
4In that respect, Wrede (1996, 2002) has pointed towards the fact that the Leviathan approach may
be seen as equivalent to a benevolent government in the limit if the marginal valuation of public spending
approaches inﬁnity.
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worldwide decentralisation trends need to be evaluated cautiously with respect to expenditure
as opposed to revenue decentralisation.
Chapters 3 and 4 further validate the mentioned questions relevant for the analysis of
tax policies in light of an internationalisation of capital investments. The respective results
support the argument that the perception of the consequences of globalisation need not
necessarily be characterised by reductions in revenues or welfare of the citizens. The results
are relevant for a single EU member state as well as for the consideration of the European
Union as one economic institution whose overall welfare ought to be maximised. In the
context of the recent ﬁnancial crisis with resulting concerted activities by all member states,
such a perception may be of high relevance.
The worldwide integration of capital markets has a signiﬁcant impact on the consequences
of a country’s federal framework for tax rate choices, as shown in chapter 3. That is, the
better integrated into international capital markets a federation is, the more likely it is to
be subject to ineﬃciently high consolidated tax rates. The fear of tax competition triggering
welfare losses as a consequence of the resulting downward pressure on tax rates thus need not
be justiﬁed. In fact, within the framework of chapter 3, welfare is more likely to be raised
by tax rate reductions. It further concludes that a federation may ﬁnd itself in a state of
‘optimal’ integration into capital markets with vertical and horizontal externalities oﬀsetting
each other, such that consolidated tax rates will be eﬃcient. That is, by striking a balance
between openness and closedness with regard to capital markets, a federation competing for
mobile capital may end up with eﬃcient levels of taxation. Put diﬀerently, the derived results
suggest that the regulation of capital markets need not necessarily lead to welfare or eﬃciency
losses, which may be of particular relevance in the context of current debates in the aftermath
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. From the perspective of the EU, perfect capital mobility within
the Union implies that with countries characterised by federal revenue structures, such as
Austria, Belgium or Germany, the welfare eﬀects of observed tax rate reductions in the course
of capital market integration need not necessarily be negative from an aggregate perspective.
This view also corresponds with the results by Becker and Fuest (2010),5 who observe a
reduction in German ‘La¨nder’ tax rates with revenues that remain stable.
With respect to the federal setup, chapter 4 shows that competition from another country
may function by oﬀsetting the tendency towards ineﬃciently high taxation possibly arising
from a country’s federal structure, thereby raising welfare. To what extent this occurs hinges,
among other things, on how elastically the competing countries react towards possible tax
rate variations with their own chosen tax rates as opposed to the change in the net return
on capital prevalent in the country.6 In that respect, a federal structure may thus be seen
5See section 1.1.
6That elasticity may be further validated in the empirical literature.
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as improving a country’s position in competing with other countries through the prevalent
ineﬃciencies it initially created. It is further implied that for the evaluation of tax policies, it
is essential for one country to anticipate the likely reactions in tax choices by its competitors.
The results can be applied to cross-national tax competition within the EU or global tax
interaction. It may further be concluded that possible tax base overlap resulting from the
introduction of an EU-level tax might improve the position of the Union in competition with
other regions.
From a diﬀerent perspective, it is demonstrated that a federal structure may be found to
act by attenuating the impact of horizontal competition eﬀects across countries. That is, for
a unitary EU member state, the trend towards ineﬃciently low tax rates resulting from tax
competition between unitary countries may be oﬀset by federal structure. Possible tax base
overlap arising from an EU-level tax thus need not be negative in the light of international
tax competition. From that perspective, the introduction of a genuine EU revenue source
may be seen as beneﬁcial by dampening the horizontal competition eﬀects within the Union
as well as by attenuating the competition member states are facing from outside the Union.
Obviously, with the described trend towards worldwide decentralisation, the outlined
results may just as well apply to a global perspective if that trend implies revenue rather
than expenditure decentralisation. The former has also been associated with eﬃciency gains
in the context of the empirical Leviathan literature. For the evaluation of resulting equilibria
it is of course of further relevance to account for whether a country’s policies are likely to
be driven by revenue or by welfare maximisation. As a current example, take the reform
of ﬁscal structure in Italy referred to in the introduction. Notwithstanding that this reform
may have been politically driven by the demand of the wealthy Northern Italian regions in
opposition to the South, it may yet raise eﬃciency if one considers the arguments made in the
empirical Leviathan literature. It may further be an interesting subject of analysis regarding
the implications of the results derived in this study.
The observed stability of revenues despite a reduction of tax rates outlined in the intro-
duction suggests for the welfare-enhancing eﬀects of tax competition to be indeed relevant.
In view of the derived results, these may be driven by Leviathan behaviour being thus re-
strained or, possibly, by tax competition reducing overall tax rates, which may have been
ineﬃciently high due to federal structure previously.
Given that the results derived in chapters 3 and 4 point in opposite directions, the re-
spective consequences ought to be seen with cautiousness. Regarding the European Union,
two things are worth mentioning: For one, the prevalent perfect mobility of capital may
be indicative of the vertical externality being dominant within the federal member states,
such that aggregate tax levels are ineﬃciently high. Yet the consequences of capital market
integration may be oﬀset by considering strategic tax interactions across countries. As such,
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it may be argued that a highly mobile tax base need not be harmful if the EU as a whole is
considered. On the other hand, regarding the introduction of an EU-level tax, which may be
characterised by possible tax base overlap, the same may hold from the perspective of the
EU as a whole in competition with other economic regions.
In summary, this study has contributed to the wide range of literature on tax competition
by including the federal structure of a country in a systematic analysis and by scrutinising the
impact a federation’s degree of openness has on chosen tax rates. It has thereby derived tools
to consider in depth the policy implications of capital market integration and a worldwide
trend towards decentralisation and regionalisation, particularly with regard to the European
Union. Notwithstanding that the trade-oﬀ in results between these two strands ought to be
borne in mind, the results may contribute to a more diﬀerentiated view of the consequences
of globalisation.
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